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For ensuring the patient safety without communication errors in hospitals, an 
effective communication skill within team members has been identified as a key point 
from literatures. It has also been proven in many occupational fields for crew 
members to effectively reduce the communication errors in their handoff. 
Situation-Background-Assessment-Recommendation (SBAR) is one of the most 
commonly used methods in the health care system. The health care system within a 
hospital is based on the teamwork provided by physicians, nurses, pharmacists, 
laboratory scientist, dietitians, and social workers etc… Not to be surprised, the caring 
quality of patient is the result of working effectiveness of team members and 
administrators. However, according to the statistic data shown, a lot of human errors 
happened during the handoff process especially in the field of communication within 
team members. Therefore the purpose of this study was to analyze the effectiveness of 
SBAR communication tool (the intervention) adapted in hospital handoff system. The 
effectiveness of the intervention was evaluated via the reported data (patient safety 
events, PSEs) to Taiwan Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation (TJCHA). This 
data source was chosen as all PSEs that have occurred will be recorded by the TJCHA. 
A report (Taiwan Patient safety Report, TPSR) will be published annually after PSE 
have been gathered from participant hospitals nationwide. In this study, we used the 
quasi experimental design to eliminate the unknown background difference from 
control and experimental group via pre and post-tests. We also used pair t-test to 
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eliminate health care system change over time elapse. 
The study period was from year 2006 to 2014, all the outcomes (or PSE), 
secondary data, obtained from TPSR were published by TJCHA annually. The 
intervention of this study adapted SBAR protocol to the handoff system in the 
experimental hospital from year 2010; meanwhile we observed the change of PSEs 
between control and experimental group. For the PSEs observation, we addressed 
them according to the TPSR classification. There are thirteen types of PSE to be 
classified as patient safety indicator (PSI) for the patient caring quality in a hospital. 
The injury degree in PSI are further classified by six levels such as death, extremely 
severe, severe, moderate, mild and no harm via severity assessment code (SAC) via 
root cause analysis (RCA). Two hospitals (the one named as control group without 
SBAR; the other one named as experimental group with SBAR intervention) 
conducted in this study were similar in hospital dimension, medical service, and 
employees. In the control group, there were 522 medical staffs including 114 
clinicians and 310 nurses etc. to provide medical services. There were a total of 443 
beds including 314 general beds and 129 special beds in this hospital. Seventeen 
specialties provided outpatient, inpatient, and emergency service which serviced a 
patient count of 514871, 11992, and 28325 patient/year respectively. In contrast to the 
control group, the experimental group adapted SBAR protocol since year 2010 and 
there were 543 staff providing medical services including 118 clinicians and 321 
nurses etc. The experimental group owned 459 beds including 333 general beds and 
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126 special beds. Fifteen specialties provided outpatient, inpatient and emergency 
service which serviced a patient count of 445340, 10471, and 25733 patients/year 
respectively. We also used the nationwide data (TPSR dataset) to serve as a reference 
group for eliminating the bias from health management policy, health insurance 
payment, and hospital accreditation etc. 
In the control group, the initial PSEs were 110 events in 2006, and by the end of 
2014, the final PSE increased up to 305 events, approximately a three times increase 
comparing to the initial year. In the experimental group, the PSEs also showed an 
increase from 100 events to 130 events in year 2006 to 2014. In the reference group 
(TPSR system), the PSEs increased from 8,176 to 60,559 events since year 2006 to 
2014. Regarding the effectiveness analysis of SBAR in handoff system, student t-test 
and general estimation equation (GEE) was used to analyze the pre (year 2009) and 
post-test (year 2010, 2012, 2014) of control and experimental group. In 2009 and 
2010 year, no significant difference was shown between the experimental and control 
group. After the implementation of SBAR in three and five years later, the PSIs 
showed a significant difference between the two groups. The experimental group have 
a decrease of 9 and 14.58 PSEs comparing to the control group on year 2012 and 
2014 respectively. If we look at the change in experimental group independently, we 
found a significant difference between year 2009 and 2014, where the PSEs in the 
experimental group was significantly increased (p <0.05), meaning that the PSE 
increased over time. However, many causes such as policy requirement, hospital 
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accreditation and health insurance payment can be the culprit of this increase than 
before. In contrast, the control group also showed a significant escalating trend over 
these years. However, via our analysis, the implementation of SBAR did effectively 
reduced the PSEs albeit the there was an increase in the total number of PSEs. The 
GEE test also showed the same results to the effectiveness by SBAR in the reduction 
of PSEs. Furthermore we analyzed the individual PSI affected by the intervention of 
SBAR. The results reveal the most effective reduction on PSEs were drug-related 
incidents (PSI 1), followed by falling incidents (PSI 2) and endo-tube incidents (PSI 
9). If only communication error was placed into consideration, the endo-tube 
incidents and injurious behaviors were significantly reduced after year 2010. Lastly, 
we performed a study evaluating the harm level on patient injury by SAC. Compared 
to the control group, the experimental group showed that the injury degree induced by 
patient events falls mainly between the level of mild to moderate (lighter injury), 
occupying approximately 40% of the total events. Suggesting that through the 
intervention of SBAR tools, when events affect patient safety occurs, the harm level 
were limited and were not as evident Based on our results and finding, the 
intervention significantly improved the patient’s health and safety, but more time is 
required to verify the time series effectiveness. Therefore, we suggest that SBAR can 
bring a better patient safety environment, but requires time to develop and adapt. The 
alteration in communication processes is a re-learning procedure and thus a 
continuous education as well as training courses provided to the staff is necessary in 
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the management of health care system. Introducing of SBAR to the handoff system is 
a critical and valuable method for improving patient’s health care quality. 
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Hospital environments are commonly characterized by complicated care actions. For 
example, a patient admitted for brain tumor surgery will normally be transferred between 
numerous units (e.g., pre-surgery holding, surgery, post anesthesia care unit, and neurosurgery 
care unit) to receive care from a variety of healthcare professionals. In this disjointed 
environment, reduction of medical errors on behalf of healthcare providers is a critical factor to 
enhance patient safety and outcomes (IOM, 2004). 
It is crucial for patients that their newest therapeutic information always goes with them 
while they are transferred from one caregiver to another. Unfortunately, that doesn’t always 
happen. Patient handoff is a necessary procedure that serves as a messenger, passing on 
valuable information in-between various hospitals or within various departments. Busy health 
care professionals may sometimes neglect such important patient information during a shift 
change, the patient’s chart may not have the newest recorded vitals of a patient, or caregivers 
may lack a clear understanding of the patient’s care plan. As mentioned above, it is obvious 
why effective communication is necessary to provide patients a safe and healthy environment. 
Nonetheless, communication errors are still so common and patient safety during transfer 
in-between hospitals or departments are so vulnerable due to these communication errors (Li, 
2009; Beach, 2003; Gandhi, 2005; Mukherjee, 2004; Sorokin, 2005).  
According to the definition provided from the Joint Commission, handoff communication 
is ―a real-time process of passing patient/client/resident-specific information from one 
caregiver to another or from one team of caregivers to another for the purpose of ensuring the 
2 
 
continuity and safety of the patient/client/resident’s care‖ (The Joint Commission, 2008). In 
fact, breakdowns in communication have been identified as a major cause of medical errors. 
According to the data provided by Joint Commission, 65 percent of sentinel events were 
primarily caused by errors in communication between 1995 and 2004. In 2005, an analysis by 
the commission determined that communication breakdowns led to 70 percent of sentinel 
events, with fully half of those occurring during handoffs.  
To address these problems, the commission introduced a National Patient Safety Goal in 
2006, requesting all hospitals to take a specific, consistent approach to handoffs of patients. For 
example, the Salem Hospital in Salem, Oregon, USA, began using crew resource management 
(CRM) techniques that were originally developed by NASA and later used throughout the 
airline industry. Through the CRM technique, all aspects of care delivery became standardized. 
In doing so, the implementation of CRM technique standardize the communication process, 
clearly define the responsibility of one caregiver to the next during a transfer procedure, it also 
provide a platform for interactive exchange of information between all concerned individuals. 
Caregivers must buildup enough trustwith the other caregivers involved in the transfer for the 
transfer procedure to be safe and efficient. In order to identify potential errors within the 
handoff process for both internal or external transitions, medical institutions must carefully 
review their current practices. For all that matters, the most important is to seek the best for the 
patient and to improve the safety of handoffs, patients should, whenever possible, be involved 
in the process because they can be strong advocates for their own interests. 
The National Patient Safety Goals released in 2006 by the Joint Commission included the 
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requirement that hospitals should use a standardized method of communication during 
handoffs, including giving all involved individuals a chance to ask and reply to questions. The 
goal does not specify, however, how organizations should accomplish this; each organization 
has to develop its own approach (Association of Perioperative Registered Nurses, 2010; Haig, 
2006). Under this circumstance, the goal should be negotiable, acknowledging the need 
in-between various departments within the organizations. To fulfill the requirement, 
organizations must specify, communicate to the staff, and then utilize a protocol that leads to a 
consistent and well established communication system to pass on patient information. 
According to the commission, consistent implementation and use across the organization is 
provided via standardization and opportunities to educate the staff about the process. Again, the 
details of the process may vary somewhat from department to department, but the essential 
premise remains the same. It is also critical to review the effectiveness of this intervention once 
it is introduced into the system and address any issues that are identified. The Joint 
Commission, in its own documentation, has provided numerous details about what such a 
standardized approach should include (JCICP, 2005; DoD, 2005). Those details include the 
following elements: 
 The situation of a given handoff 
 Who is involved, or who should be involved, in a particular handoff communication 
 Whether or not opportunities are provided for individuals involved in handoffs to pose and 
reply to questions 
 An outline describing when to employ various communication techniques, such as the 
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SBAR technique or the repeat-back or read-back techniques  
 What electronic or printed information should be made available during a given handoff 
With all of the above in mind, in this study we sought to compare the specific effectiveness 
of the SBAR communication technique for handoffs in the hospital system in Taiwan. 
1.1 Types of Handoffs in a hospital 
 In the past, the definition of ―handoff‖ was ambiguous, and thus includes various forms of 
handoffs within the healthcare environment. In hospitals, such handoffs would typically 
include shift changes for nurses, physicians transferring on-call responsibility, physicians 
transferring responsibility for a patient, an anesthesiologist reporting to a post-anesthesia 
recovery room nurse after surgery, a nurse or physician transferring a patient from the 
emergency department to an inpatient unit, and temporary relief of coverage (e.g. to allow 
short breaks during shifts, when a team member is permanently or temporarily relieved from 
duty). A good handoff strategy is intended to enhance information exchange at key times such 
as transfers of care. More importantly, it maintains continuity of care in spite of changes in 
caregivers or patients. Handoffs can also include a transfer of knowledge and information 
about the degree of uncertainty (or certainty) about diagnoses, responses to treatment, recent 
changes in status and circumstances, and the overall care plan (including alternatives). In 
addition, responsibility and authority are also transferred. In conclusion, any lack of 
understanding for those in charge of care and decision-making may be a major contributor to 
iatrogenic errors, as identified in past root cause analyses of sentinel events and negative 
outcomes (Rockville, 2006).  
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Previous study has identified 10 barriers and 10 tips for an effective handoffs (Lee, 2008): 
10 barriers to effective handoffs 
 Insufficient education at medical and nursing schools 
 A health care system that has historically supported individual performance and 
self-direction 
 Insufficient engagement with patients and their families in the care process 
 Staff resistance to change 
 Insufficient time for doctors and nurses to provide for handoffs 
 Background noise, interruptions, and other problems in the physical setting 
 Language or other communication barriers between providers and the patient. Along 
these lines, it is important for clinicians to eschew ambiguous terminology 
 Mechanical errors in communication, such as fax machines or e-mail problems or 
the inability to locate a patient record 
 A lack of definitive medical research and data to determine acceptable handoff best 
practices 
 Insufficient financial resources for the implementation of standardized handoff 
processes 
10 tips for effective handoffs 
 Make face-to-face handoffs whenever possible 
 Ensure that both sides communicate during the handoff process 
 Provide sufficient time for handoffs 
 Use both written and verbal methods of communication 
 When possible, conduct handoffs at the patient’s bedside, and be sure to involve 
patients and families in the handoff. Provide clear information at the time of 
discharge 
 Involve staff in the standards development for handoffs 
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 Incorporate various communication techniques, such as SBAR, in the handoff 
process, and require process to verify that information is both received and 
understood 
 Besides an information exchange, handoffs should make clear the transfer of patient 
responsibilities from one provider to the next 
 Use electronic medical record and other such technology, to streamline the exchange 
of accurate and timely information 
 Seek feedback from staff, and be sure to check for use and effectiveness for the 
handoff 
In hospitals, there are many types of handoffs, including the following: 
1. Changes in nursing shifts 
2. Physician transferring responsibility for a patient 
3. Physician transferring on-call responsibilities 
4. Relief of coverage on a temporary basis (as mentioned above) 
5. An anesthesiologist reporting to a post-anesthesia recovery room nurse after surgery 
6. Physician and nurse transferring a patient from the emergency department to an inpatient 
unit 
A proper handoff should include all of the following components:  
 Responsibility: During handoffs, it is the provider’s responsibility to ensure that the 
recipient is aware of the responsibility passed on to them. 
 Accountability: A provider remains accountable until both parties are aware of the 
responsibility that has been transferred. 
 Uncertainty: When there is any uncertainty, the provider must clear up all 
ambiguities before the transfer is completed.  
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 Verbal communication: A provider should not assume that the person taking over the 
responsibility will read or understand written or non-verbal communications. 
 Acknowledgment: Until it is has been acknowledged that a handoff is understood 
and accepted, a provider cannot relinquish responsibility. 
 Opportunity: Handoffs are good opportunities to review and have the next provider 
assess the situation for both quality of care and safety (Rockville, 2006). 
 Organizations must define, communicate to staff, and introduce a protocol that leads 
to a consistent and well established communication system to pass on of patient 
information, if they are to meet the Joint Commission requirements. According to 
the commission, standardization allows the organizations to raise an opportunity to 
educate staff about the process and to provide support to the consistent 
implementation as well as practice the approach across the organization. 
1.2 Techniques and Tools to Aid in Handoffs  
Various techniques and tools can aid in the handoff process and establish consistent 
communications. Institutions should use structured tools (e.g mnemonics, templates, or 
checklists) to ensure that no information is omitted during a handoff. These techniques can also 
help ensure the accuracy and timely exchange of information. Listed below are some common 
techniques that hospitals can adopt or adapt to benefit their organization’s culture and needs. 
These techniques can be used in combination (Gurses, 2006; Lee, 2008). 
1. Audiotapes: Audiotapes are a fairly typical method of sharing information during handoffs. 
They provide nurse and doctor a fast, effective way of communication, and they can be 
backed up by the use of a predetermined checklist. The clinician taking over can be 
provided with a detailed assessment from the former clinician through an audiotape. 
However, audiotapes do not, when used alone, meet the Joint Commission’s National 
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Patient Safety Goals since those who are involved in the handoff was not given an 
opportunity to answer and ask questions. Ideally, the outgoing caregiver should stay 
on-site during the review of the audiotape to allow for a face-to-face discussion. 
2. Checklists and forms: Checklists and similar forms is an alternative method for 
standardized and quick exchange of information. This process can be accelerated through 
information technology systems, such as electronic medical records. Checklists and other 
forms can be placed in the patient record. Paper forms can also be passed on physically 
from one caregiver to the next. When electronic forms are utilized, it is crucial to make 
sure that the information is received and reviewed, and again, it’s very important to allow 
caregivers to ask questions and answer them. 
3. The ―Five Ps‖: Developed by Sentara Health Care in Norfolk, Va., the Five Ps streamline 
the transfer of responsibility among caregivers and also streamline patient information. 
The Five Ps are ―Patient‖ (including name, identifiers, age, sex, and location), ―Plan‖ 
(including diagnosis, treatment plan, and next steps), ―Purpose‖ (which consists of 
providing a rationale for the care plan), ―Problems‖ (which consists of explaining what’s 
different or unusual about this specific patient), and ―Precautions‖ (which consists of 
explaining what’s expected to be different or unusual about the patient).  
4. ―I PASS the BATON‖: This mnemonic technique was recommended by the Department of 
Defense’s Patient Safety Program as a way to provide optimal structure for improving 
communication during transitions in care (Table 1). The technique should include chances 
to confirm receipt, to ask questions, to clarify information, and to verify that the 
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information has been understood. This technique is designed to assist in both complicated 
and simple handoffs.  
Table 1 Description of the “I PASS the BATON” technique 
Ps: Source: Department of Defense Patient Safety Program, ―Healthcare Communications Toolkit to Improve 
Transitions in Care,‖ 2008 
 
 
5. SBAR is a communications technique that was modeled on a process first used on nuclear 
submarines (Table 2). It helps ensure the consistent and concise exchange of information. 
Hospitals have been adopting SBAR to improve communication among clinicians, and it is 
also being adopted to standardize the informational exchanges during patient handoffs. 
SBAR is generally deemed suitable for simple handoffs, but some healthcare experts feel 
that SBAR does not delve deeply enough to provide the level of information needed 
Symbol Mean Description 
I Introduction Introduce yourself and your role/job (include the patient) 
P Patient Name, age, sex, location, and other identifiers 
A Assessment Current chief complaint, vital signs, symptoms, and diagnosis 
S Situation Present condition and circumstances, including code status, 
level of certainty or uncertainty, and recent changes and 
responses to treatment 
S Safety 
Concerns 
Critical lab reports and related values, socioeconomic factors, 
allergies and alerts, such as risk for falls and the like 
the   
B Background Previous episodes, current medications, comorbidities, and 
family history 
A Actions Detail what approaches to treatment were taken or are required 
and then provide a brief rationale for those actions  
T Timing Explicit timing, prioritization of actions, and degree of 
urgency 
O Ownership Who is responsible (nurse/doctor/team) at present? This 
includes patient and family responsibilities 
N Next What will occur next? Are there any anticipated changes?  
Any contingency plans? What is the plan?  
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during a complicated handoff (Velji, 2008). 
Table 2 Description of the SBAR technique 
S Situation Patient’s problem, diagnosis, treatment plan, wants, and needs 
B Background Vital signs, list of medications, lab results, and mental and 
code status  
A Assessment Current provider’s assessment of the patient’s condition 
R Recommendation Recommend what needs to be done over the next few hours 
and beyond, and identify pending lab results 
 
1.3 Introduction to SBAR and the Communication Techniques 
Inadequate communication has been recognized as the most common cause of serious 
errors, both clinically and organizationally. There are several fundamental barriers to 
communication that exist across different disciplines and level of staff, including gender, 
hierarchy, ethnic background as well as differences in communication styles among disciplines 
and individuals. Where there are standard structures of communication in place promotion of 
communication between team members are more effective. The SBAR technique is one of 
them to standardize communication. It promotes patient safety by helping individuals to 
communicate with each other with a shared set of expectations. Nursing staff and physicians 
can use SBAR to share patient information within a concise and structured format, improving 
efficiency and accuracy. The SBAR technique was originally developed by the US Navy for 
use on nuclear submarines, and a company called ―Safer Healthcare‖ introduced the technique 
into healthcare settings late in the 1990s as one aspect of its CRM training program. In the 
years since, SBAR has been adopted by healthcare facilities around the globe as a simple but 
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effective way to standardize communications between caregivers (Cynthia, 2009). 
1.4 Purpose of This Study and Research Questions 
One major factor contributing to medical errors is communication failure among healthcare 
providers (Ayse & Yan, 2006). Transferring patients between hospital units for surgery or 
diagnostic tests is common in modern hospital settings. Communication breakdowns during 
transfers are a leading cause of discontinuity in care, which increases the likelihood of medical 
mishaps, failures to rescue, and increased complications. Research is thus required to help 
providers understand what information is communicated during patient handoffs. Accordingly, 
the purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the SBAR communication tool as 
applied to patient handoffs in a hospital, and to analyze the latent effectiveness on patient 
safety after SBAR application.  
Two primary questions will be addressed in this study: one target on patient safety issues 
that are caused by communication errors and the other target on improvements in the patient 
handoff system due to the effectiveness of SBAR. 
1.5 Definitions of Terminology 
1. Handoff: ―The complete transfer of responsibility and care-giving activities from one 
provider to another, where the initial provider subsequently physically leaves the scene‖ 
(C.K. Christian, 2006). 
2. Healthcare provider: a person who provides patient care, with a professional affiliation such 




3. Multi-professional: healthcare providers from multiple professions working together 
(including physicians, nurses, pharmacists, dieticians, infection control experts, social 
workers, respiratory therapists, case managers, lab worker, and service staff members). 
2. Literature Review 
For more than two decades, medical professionals have known that weak communication 
between healthcare providers influences patient care outcomes. As the healthcare environment 
has grown more complex, the sharing of patient clinical information among multiple providers 
has became more problematic. In numerous studies, communication issues among providers 
were shown to lead to increased medical error. This knowledge led researchers to focus on 
understanding how poor communication can induce medical errors and how better 
communication could potentially reduce the number of adverse events, improving patient 
outcomes.  
The Harvard Medical Practice Study reported in the 1990s that undesirable events, such as 
medical errors, are often precipitated by complex interactions among a diverse group of 
caregivers, the patient and the patient’s diagnosis (Leape, 1997). In response, Leape suggested 
avoid from blaming individuals to examine the contextual influences on error, including 
communication failures. Based on these recommendations, Wilson et al. (1995) examined the 
adverse events that occurred in 28 Australian hospitals and concluded that communication 
failures contributed to errors much more often than inadequate medical skills. A systematic 
approach also aided the Institute of Medicine’s examination of the US healthcare environment 
and led to the recognition that a new healthcare delivery system that supported safe patient care 
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was deeply required.  
2.1 Collaboration and Communication in Hospital Settings  
Numerous researchers (Larson, 1999; Mitchell, 2000; Bensing, 2005; Webster, 2012) have 
proposed that increasing collaboration among healthcare professionals would provide a 
solution to the above issues. Specific attention has frequently been focused on the quality of 
collaborations and communications between nurses and doctors (Vazirani, 2005; McCaffrey, 
2011; Rothberg, 2012). Vazirani (2005) has observed that a collaborative working relationship 
is characterized not by subordination but by interdependence, and requires mutuality. Doctors 
and nurses, however, often have differing outlooks on the desirability or even existence of such 
relationships (Vazirani, 2005). The often differing views of these two professional groups 
reflect their historical roles and also the ―disparities between physicians and nurses with regard 
to socioeconomic status, education, and socialization‖ (Larson, 1999). The historical roles of 
different types of healthcare providers are clear in Stein’s description of ―the doctor-nurse 
game,‖ in which both doctors and nurses modify their communication behaviors with members 
of the other profession so that a hierarchical, power-based relationship was maintained 
(Flowerdew, 2012). Unfortunately, this way of communication is inefficient in that it actually 
requires both parties to use an indirect way of communication in order to gather the 
information necessary to plan and collaborate patient care (Baggs, 1988). While reviewing this 
issue, Stein et al. (1990) found that social developments and difference in the education and 
training of nurses and doctors has been influencing a shift from this hierarchical sort of model 
to one of collegiality and interdependence. 
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2.2 Healthcare Environments, Medical Mistakes, and Effective 
Communication  
Recognition of these issues suggests that research was required to determine an efficient 
way for healthcare providers to exchange information and identify the factors for effective 
communication among providers (Manser, 2009). In addition, researchers began to see that 
communication in complex hospital environments consists of various frameworks; meaning, 
several synchronized and unsynchronized communication measures, devices and channels are 
used simultaneously by healthcare providers (Benham-Hutchins, 2010, Collins, 2011). Some of 
these communication methods, such as the telephone, have been noted as adding to complexity 
and disruption in the working environment by interrupting healthcare providers when they are 
working on another task (Wentworth, 2012). Uncertainty and time constraints add further to the 
complexity of healthcare environments and affect both the manners and methods used to pass 
along patient information. Leape et al. (1993, 1994) pointed out that, rather than blaming 
individuals, ―preventing medical injury will require attention to the systemic causes and 
consequences of errors.‖ In order to provide multi-professionals a platform to collaborate and 
communicate; reevaluation of current healthcare organization’s structural and cultural support 
or constrain individual actions of various practitioner is necessary. Moreover, a systematic 
approach requires accepting the fact that humans make mistakes. While acknowledging the 
above, develops a system of safeguards and provide the necessary measures to identify, 
respond to, and prevent problems (Pham, 2012). Medical errors and communication challenges 
may include all of the following (Rockville, 2006): 
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 Language barriers: Particular challenges are posed by non-English speaking patients 
and/or staff  
 Personalities: It is sometimes difficult to communicate with certain individuals 
 Distractions: Emergencies can take a provider’s attention away from the task at hand  
 Conflict: Disagreements between individuals may disrupt the flow of information 
between them 
 Workload: During times of heavy workloads, some necessary details may not be 
communicated, or they may be communicated but go unverified 
 Shift changes: Communication breakdowns occur most often when transitions in 
care are made  
 Various communication styles: Different types of healthcare workers have 
historically been trained with different communication styles 
 Verification of information: It is critical to always verify and acknowledge the 
information exchanged. A retrospective study of adverse events by Horwitz et al. 
determined that omissions of information (for example, vital signs and medical 
history) were a factor commonly associated with adverse events (Horwitz L.I, et al., 
2009). 
2.3 Barriers in Patient Handoff Communication 
The actual or perceived social status of healthcare providers and hierarchical environments 
may create barriers that interfere with coordination of care by determining who is eligible to 
raise issues or ask questions (Benham-Hutchins et al., 2010). A patient handoff such as one in 
which the ―complete transfer of responsibility and care-giving activities from one provider to 
another, where the initial provider subsequently physically leaves the scene‖ has been 
identified as a process that is communication-dependent and particularly vulnerable to errors of 
omission (Foster & Manser, 2012). Those healthcare providers taking over the patient requires 
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up-to-date information in order to make good decisions and provide excellent care. This 
requires information to flow freely between the healthcare providers transferring the patient 
and those taking over (Pham et al., 2012). Barriers to effective information transfers during 
handoffs include ―the social setting, language barriers, medium of communication, time and 
convenience issues, and education issues‖ (Foster, 2012). Inadequate communication during 
handoffs may also result in increased medication errors, increased lengths of stay and 
unnecessary or redundant laboratory and diagnostic tests. 
 
2.4 Patient Handoffs in Emergency Departments 
Healthcare today occurs in an increasingly complicated clinical environment. Patients 
receive intervention from a variety of teams, each made of up multiple clinicians with different 
backgrounds, training, and expertise. Effective communications amongst these professionals is 
needed in order to provide high-quality, safe patient care within this environment. Breakdowns 
in communication have been described as preventable aspects of diagnostic errors and have 
been linked to delays in referrals and care as well as increase in mortality rates. Furthermore, 
experts estimate that failures in communication are the major factor in 60-70% of serious 
incidents. In a review of the reported adverse events that led to permanent disabilities in 
Australia, 11% were determined to be attributable to communication issues, a level almost 
double that attributed to inadequate skill levels among clinicians. Meanwhile, a review of 
major adverse events from 2005 to 2008 showed that communication problems were a 
significant contributor in 35% of cases. (The above mentioned data were extracted from the 
RiskMan (Runny, 2008; Finnigan, 2010) data collection, which depends upon voluntary 
17 
 
reporting of adverse events.)  
Poorly handled handoffs were identified by both ER physicians and hospital physicians as a 
major factor in adverse events (Apker J., 2007; Horwitz L.I., 2009). Horwitz et al found that 
29% (n = 246) of the physicians surveyed reported experiencing an adverse event or near miss 
after emergency department transfers, and 36 specific mistakes were identified, including 
treatment errors (n = 14), disposition errors (n = 13), and diagnostic errors (n = 13) (Horwitz 
L.I., 2009). Failures in providing the latest vital signs during handoffs were cited in 10 of the 
36 incidents, making them, the most prevalent cause of incidents. Information technology was 
also an issue in several errors, such as when vital signs recorded in the emergency department 
were not electronically visible. In another study, mishandled or delayed handoffs were reported 
to result in treatment delays. (Apker J., 2007). In particular, failures to communicate properly 
about pending tests and diagnostic results were a major cause of delay in care after a transfer. 
(Ong M.S., 2011). 
2.5 Patient Handoffs in Operating Rooms 
Wrong-site surgery rates are estimated to range from 0.09 to 4.5 per 10,000 surgical cases 
(Devine J. et al., 1976). The most common mistakes leading to wrong-site surgeries are failures 
to verify consent, scheduling errors, patient malpositioning, site-marking errors, lack of proper 
time-out, and surgeon decisions or technique issues in the operation room (OR) (Clarke J.R., 
2007). A proper time-out involves verification of patient identity, procedure confirmation, and 
surgical site confirmation. In a systematic review, among the factors contributing to wrong-site 
surgery were increased age of the surgeon, multiple surgeons working on one case, multiple 
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procedures being performed on one patient, emergency situations, and variant patient anatomy 
(Devine J. et al., 1976). Postoperative patient handovers are beset with potential technical and 
communication errors and may negatively impact patient safety. More than 40 million patients 
have surgery in the United States annually (Anesth A., 2012) and are subsequently transferred 
to a post-anesthesia care unit or intensive care unit (ICU) for recovery. According to an 
extensive review of the literature (Noa S. et al., 2012), these transfers are notable for poor 
teamwork and communication, patients arriving in a compromised state, lack of clarity in 
procedures, technical errors, lack of structure in processes, interruptions and distractions, lack 
of central information repositories, and nurse inattention due to multitasking. A correlation 
between poor quality handovers and adverse events has also been demonstrated, although 
causality has not been proven. Several advices and recommendataions were made to potentially 
improve the quality of postoperative handovers and the safety of patients during this critical 
period. 
Commentators have made various recommendations for structuring the handoff process 
and for information transfer. Some of these recommendations are generally supported, 
including (1) the use of standardized processes (e.g., through the use of checklists and 
protocols); (2) ensuring the attention of all team members by completing urgent clinical tasks 
before the information transfer; (3) allowing only patient-specific discussions during verbal 
handovers; (4) requiring that all relevant team members be present and that each should have 
an opportunity to speak or ask questions; and (5) providing training in team skills and 
communication. Through investigations of surgical patient transfers, researchers have found 
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that communication failures were distributed equally over all phases of surgical care: 
preoperative (38%), intra-operative (30%), and postoperative (32%), (Anwari J.S., 2002). 
Transfers in care and handoffs were particularly susceptible to communication errors, with 
43% of communication failures occurring during handoffs and 39% occurring during 
intra-hospital transfers (Nagpal K., 2010; Smith A.F., 2008; Catchpole K.R., 2007). Surgical 
handoffs were again highlighted as being particularly poor in terms of communication (Anwari 
J.S. 2002; Nagpal K., 2010). The surgical team was frequently uninvolved in the handoff, and 
information on intra-operative events was typically conveyed by the anesthetic team, which 
could be unaware of surgery related issues (Nagpal K., 2010). Strategies to avoid surgical 
mistakes before they can occur include organizational interventions and policies such as having 
a standardized operating room layout, team stability to increase familiarity among team 
members, standardized procedures and checklists for critical tasks, clutter elimination, noise 
reduction, and short breaks to reduce fatigue (Wiegmann DA., et al. 2010). Additionally, 
various briefing tools can be used before the surgery begins to review names and roles of 
surgical team members, critical procedural steps, potential complications, and prophylactic 
measures. These tools enhance communication (Nundy S., et al. 2008) and have lessened 
hazardous events during surgery by 25% (Einav Y., et al. 2010). 
2.6 Patient Handoffs in Intensive Care Units 
 Research into handoffs for patients being discharged from ICUs is still sparse. Most 
studies to date have focused on the physiological criteria that must be met before proceeding 
with a discharge. The Society of Critical Care Medicine, for example, has provided detailed 
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discharge criteria to assist physicians in making discharge decisions (Society of Critical Care 
Medicine, 1999). However, the role of handoffs communication in this particular scenario is 
still poorly understood. Studies published to date have revealed a number of inter-professional 
communication barriers. For example, decisions are typically made by physicians and then 
communicated to senior staff members only (Watts R. et al., 2005). Tension between ICU team 
members and ward nurses has also been noted as a frequent issue. In a review of 
communication failures due to problems with ancillary staff availability, liaison issues, and 
poor communication in handoffs involving intra-hospital transfers from the ICU to other 
destination units, 31% of the incidents had significant adverse outcomes (Beckmann U., et al. 
2004; Lovell M.A., 2001; Ong M.S., 2011). Other research has shown that using a specialized 
transport team for both inter- and intra-hospital transfers of critical care patients leads to a 
decrease in adverse events (Dunn M.J. et al., 2007.; Stearley H.E., 1998.; McGinn G.H. et al., 
1996). 
2.7 Application of SBAR in Patient Handoffs 
Fortunately, the use of a structured methodology for communicating by using a 
standardized tool can improve the quality of the information exchanged. One such tool, SBAR, 
has been demonstrated to improve communication in various setting. The tool was developed 
by the US Navy to standardize urgent and critical communications in nuclear submarines. 
SBAR was also implemented in healthcare environments by a multidisciplinary team at Kaiser 
Permanente of Colorado and has since become a commonly used and effective tool, adapted 
for a wide variety of clinical scenarios in the USA. Because the SBAR format captures crucial 
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information and streamlines communication, many organizations have found it to be useful for 
all sort of inter-staff communications, including physician to physician, physician to nurse or 
nurse to physician, and staff to physician. SBAR may also be used to give such information to 
care providers taking over during all types of handoffs, including referrals. In addition, there is 
a growing consensus among healthcare providers that SBAR’s structure empowers staff, 
especially those who may feel timid when speaking to physicians or nurses, to communicate 
critical observations. The model serves as an effective tool to standardize communication, 
promote patient ownership and enhance provider empowerment. Although initially instituted 
for practitioners who are not doctors, many hospitals are now implementing SBAR for all 
healthcare providers.  
In the past several years, resident duty-hour limitations have introduced a new component 
in patient care. Although studies have indicated an overall decrease in medical errors and 
enhanced quality of resident life since duty-hour limitations were imposed, preservation of 
continuity of care remains a major challenge. Implementation of the 80-hour work week has 
led to an increase in daily resident handoffs by 40% and created a system in which shift work 
and dependence on non-physician practitioners, including nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants, have become the norm. Studies have demonstrated that within this new paradigm of 
patient care, there has been an increase in preventable adverse events, longer lengths of patient 
stay, and an increase in laboratory study orders, all of which are attributable to errors in 
resident communication due to increased handoffs. A study by Williams et al. further identified 
that resident with such failures could be induced by decreased familiarity with patients among 
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surgeons, distorted or inhibited communications, blurred boundaries of communication, and 
diverted surgeon attention. Using a system that instills a sense of patient ownership, a clear 
definition of roles and empowerment is crucial to promote patient safety and continuity of care. 
In the current study, we hypothesized that inclusion of a standardized resident handoff system 
into the surgical curriculum could minimize missed or misunderstood information, improving 
overall patient care outcomes. We chose SBAR as that system because it provides an excellent 
framework for communication, serving as an empowerment tool by allowing opportunities to 
ask questions, formulate a plan for care, and ensure that information was understood. 
Furthermore, SBAR is being implemented on an institution-wide basis, ensuring that 
communication standardization occurs among all healthcare providers (Cohen & Hilligoss, 
2010). Handoffs encompass more than just the exchange of information; they involve a transfer 
of accountability and responsibility, as well as being a teaching opportunity ((Michelle A., 
Raduma T. et al., 2011). 
 
2.8 Information Technology Applied in SBAR 
The use of information technology provides a promising strategy for improving patient 
handoffs. Coupled with information from the given patient’s electronic medical record (EMR), 
handoff tools can include automatic reminders, comprehensive presentations of patient history 
and data, increased patient information, and remote accessibility (Bernstein J.A. et al., 2010). 
When asked about the potential of various strategies, physicians ranked access to EMRs and 
close patient follow-ups as the strategies most likely to prevent diagnostic errors (Singh H., et 
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al. 2010). By aggregating information specific to a patient and assisting in feedback, computer 
systems can lessen the cognitive burden of the health care provider, revamp patient follow-ups, 




3. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of this study is shown in Figure 1; the SBAR intervention was 
used in the handoff system of an experimental hospital since year 2010. The PSI data from 
TPSR was the observed outcome used in this study, generally this data represented all clinical 
units in a participant hospital reporting to TPSR dataset (no individual department data in 
TPSR dataset); we selected two hospitals with same scale to serve as a control group and an 
experimental group. A quasi experiential design (also shown in Fig. 1) was used in this study 
to eliminate errors/bias from the hospital itself and cross hospital difference. In Aim 1 to 4, we 
used student t test for comparing the difference between control and experimental group, and 
by student t test we avoid the difference in hospital characteristics. Regarding to Aim 5 to 7, 
the purpose was to eliminate the change in health policy, insurance payment, hospital 
accreditation over time (since year 2006 to 2014). The intervention of SBAR applied in the 
experimental group was initiated at January, 2010. Since this year the caregivers in the 
experimental group need to adapt the SBAR tool in patient handoffs and this action lasted for 
five years. Till the end of this study, this tool continued to play a role in patient handoffs in the 
experimental group. In contrast, the control group kept their previous handoff tool for patient 
care. The PSE data of control and experimental group retrieved from TPSR was compared in 
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3.1 Aim and Hypothesis 
The aims and research hypotheses of this study were described as below: 
1. Aim 1: To analyze the pre-performance differences between the experimental and control 
groups before the implementation of the SBAR communication tool in the handoff system. 
Research hypothesis 1: We hypothesized that no significant difference is present in 
patient care indicators between the traditional handoff system for the experimental and 
control groups.  
2. Aim 2: To analyze the group performance differences immediately in the implementation 
of SBAR in the handoff system. 
Research hypothesis 2: We hypothesized a significant difference between the 
experimental group (with SBAR intervention) and the control group (without SBAR 
intervention) in patient care indicators.  
3. Aim 3: To analyze the group performance differences immediately after three years of 
SBAR implementation in the handoff system. 
Research hypothesis 3: We hypothesized a significant difference between the 
experimental group (with SBAR intervention) and the control group (without SBAR 
intervention) in patient care indicators.  
4. Aim 4: To analyze the group performance differences four months after five years of 
SBAR implementation in the handoff system. 
Research hypothesis 4: We hypothesized a significance difference between the 
experimental group (with SBAR intervention) and the control group (without SBAR 
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Intervention) in patient care indicators four months after five years of SBAR 
implementation.  
5. Aim 5: To analyze the immediate performance difference in the same types of medical 
team with or without SBAR intervention in the handoff system. 
Research hypothesis 5: We hypothesized a significance difference for experimental 
group teams (with SBAR intervention) but not for control group teams (without SBAR 
intervention). 
6. Aim 6: To analyze the long-term (3 years after) performance differences in the same types 
of medical team with or without SBAR intervention in the handoff system. 
Research hypothesis 6: We hypothesized a long-term significant difference for 
experimental group teams (with SBAR intervention) but not for control group teams 
(without SBAR intervention). 
7. Aim 7: To analyze the long-term (5 years after) performance differences in the same types 
of medical team with or without SBAR intervention in the handoff system. 
Research hypothesis 7: We hypothesized a long-term significant difference for 
experimental group teams (with SBAR intervention) but not for control group teams 





3.2 Process of SBAR implementation 
In our study, we adapted second edition SBAR tool which was published from Toronto 
Rehab (Trentham, B. et al, 2010). Table 3 shows the implementation stages of SBAR in the 
experimental group. Two basic stages (stage 1 and 2) named as education and implementation 
stage. The education stage lasted for four weeks, educating caregivers what is and how to use 
SBAR tool in their handoff, and during the period of SBAR implementation we continued to 
train the new and unfamiliar caregivers by the same course. After the education stage, we 
observed and screened the handoff’s process, whether they followed the protocol in their 
handoff. If the expectations were not met, the training course was again given to those teams 
that didn’t do well in handoff via administration order. This evaluation and education were 
performed once every half year. In the experimental group, under the committee of SBAR 
implementation, the education and evaluation work were carried out in each care-providing 
team member and support staff, ensuring the completeness of SBAR work.  Table 4 is the 





Table 3 Implementation stages of adapted SBAR 
Weeks One & Two Week Four Ongoing over Two Months 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
Implementation and Evaluation Education Session #1 & #2 Education Session #3 
1. Education Session #1 
Communication in Health 
Care and Using the 
SBAR Tool (didactic 
session) (suggested time: 
1.5 hrs) (Education 
Session #1 Resources) 
2. Education Session #2 
Experiential-Based 
Learning with the 
Adapted SBAR Tool 
(practice session) 
(suggested time: 2.0 hrs) 
(Education Session #2 
Resources) 
** or combine Sessions #1 & 
#2 in a 2-hour session 
(Slides with Notes #1+2 
condensed) 
3. Participants begin to use 
SBAR 
1. Education Session #3 
SBAR Team Focus 
Group Discussion 




2. Respond to any 
questions/difficulties 
expressed by 
participants in their 
initial experiences 
using SBAR 
3. Seek feedback on 





1. Monitor and evaluate implementation 
process using the forms provided (Stage 
II Resources) 
2. Audit each participant approximately one 
month after Education Session #2 and 
again at the end of the implementation 
period (e.g., at six months) (Stage II 
Resources: ―One-on-One Interview 
Questionnaire‖ and ―Confidence and 
Implementation Tracking Form‖) 
3. Ongoing audit at rounds or team 
meetings (approximately every 2 weeks) 
to track usage, as well as enablers of and 
barriers to use. (Stage II Resources: 
―Team Rounds Tracking Form‖) 
4. Identify key champion(s) to encourage 
and reinforce team use of SBAR 
5. Offer ongoing training of new staff, 
volunteers and students 
6. Review participant feedback and 
evaluations 











Hello, my name is ... and I work in … (your service) 
I need to tell you about: 
□ An urgent health issue in regards to … (name of client) 
□ A quality of care issue in regards to… (name of client) 
I need approximately … (minutes) to speak with you. If now is not a good time, 
when can we talk? 
I need you to be aware of :  
□ Changes to the patient’s status 
□ Changes to the treatment plan, protocols or procedures 




Are you aware of … (specific problem)? 
The patient is … (age) and has received a diagnosis of …. (diagnosis) and … 
(diagnosis) 
He/She was admitted on … (date) and is scheduled to be discharged on … (date) 
His/Her treatment plans in relation to this issue to date has include … (treatment) 
He/She is being overseen by … (specialist) and has appointments for …  
(procedures) 






I think the main underlying issue/concern is … (describe) 
The primary changes related to the specific concern since the last assessment : 
Patient Level Changes 
 








□ Cognitive/Mental Status/ 
Behavioral 





□ Home/Community Safety 
 
Environmental Changes 
□ Organizational/Unit Protocols/ 
Processes 
□ Social/Family Supports 







According to this assessment, I request that:  
□ we continue /discontinue … 
□ we prepare for patient discharge OR extend the patient’s discharge date 
□ you approve the recommended changes to the treatment plan/goals including … 
□ you revisit and reassess the patient’s … 
□ the following tests/evaluations be completed by … 
□ the patient be moved to …/transferred to … 
□ you inform other team members/the patient/ the patient’s family about  
   the change in plans 
□ We modify team protocols in the following ways … 
 
To be clear, we have decided to … Are you okay with this plan? 
□ I would like to hear from you again by … 





5. Materials and Methods    
To analyze the effectiveness of SBAR, we used a quasi-experimentation design for 
systematically comparing the pre-and-post outcomes to SBAR intervention between an 
experimental group, a control group, and a reference group. The detail methodology of this 
study including measurement method, study design, hospital profile, data collection etc. is 
described as below. 
4.1 Study Design 
In this study, we used a quasi-experimental design to eliminate an unknown background 
difference from control and experimental group via pre and post-test. Before the intervention 
(as phase one), we pre-tested the events of patient safety between control and experimental 
group to eliminate the potential bias in this study by student t and GEE (Generalized 
Estimation Equation, GEE) test. We also used student t and GEE test to test the statistical 
significance between the control and experimental groups. After that, in the experimental group 
(as phase two), we adapted the tool of SBAR in handoff and compare the ongoing difference 
in patient safety between those two groups. The pair t-test also was used to eliminate the 
change in hospital environments itself over the time elapse. Detail of our study design is 
described below.  
1. Phase 1: Before the intervention of SBAR adaption 
In the first phase (year 2006 to 2010), we gathered the information regarding the handoff 
that was used from each clinical department, and from these information, we made the standard 
SBAR format. We named this intervention as adaption SBAR in our study. Regarding the 
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outcomes of the PSI data in the control, experimental and reference group, we indirectly 
retrieved them from the dataset of TPSR each year as these PSI data had been confirmed by 
hospital’s administration and TPSR system. After care evaluation, there were no ambiguous 
dataset in this reported dataset.  
2. Phase 2: To implement and evaluate adaption SBAR tool in the experimental group 
During the year 2010 to 2014, it was the implementation phase of SBAR in the 
experimental hospital. In this phase, all full-time and part-time clinical and support staffs were 
required to use SBAR tool in their handoff work. We then observed and assured the SBAR tool 
were been performed correctly by reviewing their SBAR sheet or information in the 
experimental hospital. If the SBAR tool were not performed correctly by clinicians or team 
member, they will be re-educated and re-assured by their clinical or administration leader. For 
each clinical department, these works were reviewed by SBAR promote committee in the 
experimental hospital once every quarter. If the underperformance of SBAR implementation 
persists in the clinical department, they will be corrected by the researcher as soon as noted. 
During the study period, we also selected a hospital with similar scale to serve as the 
control group; implementation of SBAR protocol in its handoff system to clinical caregivers 
was not done. Moreover, we like to know the PSI change of Taiwan’s hospitals, so we selected 
the regional hospitals to serves as a reference group, and their data was calculated by average 




5.2 Profile of participating Hospitals 
This study was conducted in two hospitals with similar scale located in Taipei city, 
Taiwan. We named the first hospital as ―hospital A‖ and placed it as the experimental 
group in this study. Intervention of SBAR tool in its handoff system was introduced since 
year 2010. The detail profile of hospital A is listed in Table 5a and 5b.  There was 543 
staff providing medical services including 118 clinicians and 321 nurses etc. The 
experimental group owned 459 beds including 333 general beds and 126 special beds. 
Fifteen specialties provided outpatient, inpatient and emergency service which serviced a 
patient count of 445340, 10471, and 25733 patients/year respectively. In the experimental 
group, we adapted the intervention of SBAR protocol to replace its original handoff 
system since year 2010 compared the effectiveness before and after the intervention. In 
contrast to the experimental group, the control group had a similar scale in medical 
services as showed in Table 5a and 5b. In the control group, there were 522 medical 
staffs including 114 clinicians and 310 nurses etc. to provide medical services. There were 
a total of 443 beds including 314 general beds and 129 special beds in this hospital. 
Seventeen specialties provided outpatient, inpatient, and emergency service which 
serviced a patient count of 514871, 11992, and 28325 patient/year respectively. As shown 
above, both hospitals are similar in number of staffs, beds, departments, and patient load, 
the main difference being introduction of SBAR tool into the caregiver of the 
experimented group since year 2010. The patient safety events, between pre and post 
intervention of experimental and control group, were used as the indicator to verify 
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change in care quality; they were also used to evaluate the effectiveness of SBAR 







Table 5a Profiles of the participating units and hospitals 
Characteristics Control group Experimental group unit 
hospital level teaching and regional hospital  
 
hospital number 1 1 number 
Handoff type Traditional  
before year 2010: traditional  
After year 2010: SBAR 
N/A 
Professional    
Clinicians 114 118 person 
Nurses 310 321 person 
Pharmacist 25 27 person 
Examiner 26 26 person 
Social worker 12 14 person 
Others 35 37 person 
Sub-total  522 543 person 





Table 5b Profiles of the participating units and hospitals 
Characteristics Control group Experimental group unit 
Specialty number 17 15 number 
Specialty 
Department of Family Medicine, 
Department of Pediatrics, Department 
of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 
Department of Orthopedics, 
Department of Neurology, 
Department of Otolaryngology, 
Department of Ophthalmology, 
Department of Dermatology, 
Department of Psychiatry and 
Rehabilitation, Department of 
Anesthesiology, Department of 
Radiology oncology, Department of 
Anatomy and Pathology, Department 
of Emergency Medicine, Orthopedics, 
General Western medicine, General 
Department of Dentistry, General 
Department of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine 
Department of Family Medicine, 
Department of Pediatrics, 
Department of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, Department of 
Orthopedics, Department of 
Neurology, Department of 
Ophthalmology, Department of 
Dermatology and Psychiatry, 
Department of Radiology, 
Department of Anatomy and 
Pathology, Department of Clinical 
Pathology, Department of 
Emergency Medicine, Department 
of Orthopedics, General Surgery, 
Department of General Dentistry, 
General Department of Chinese 
Medicine 
specialty 
General Beds 314 333 beds 
Special Beds 129 126 beds 
Volume 
Outpatient  514,871                445,340  Num./year 
Inpatients 11,992                  10,471  Num./year 
Emergency  28,325  




 length of stay 
        10  12 Days/patient 
Operation   5,186                    4,788  Num./year 
Occupancy rate 
 (Beds) 
       73  67 % 




4.3 Data categories and collection steps 
4.3.1 Category of patient safety indicators 
The reason we retrieved PSI’s data from TPSR dataset and used it as quality indicators for 
patient safety was because this is an official report send from hospitals to Taiwan Patient Safety 
Net (TPSN, ministry of health and welfare, Taiwan). These patient safety events dataset were 
then verified by ministry of health and welfare (MOHW), Taiwan and published annually. 
There are various indicators to evaluate the quality of patient safety in hospital management, 
and this data we used (published by TPSR), contains all iatrogenic and adverse events that had 
happened in the clinical units. Nearly all hospitals are required to report their PSEs annually 
according to the rule of MOHW, Taiwan. In this database, there are thirteen sets of PSI data 
that can be used as indicators for assessing patient safety in hospitals. Generally speaking, 
common incidents are categorized into medical error, medical adverse event, sentinel event and 
medication. Whereas domestic and international hospitals currently classify incident reporting 
contents into medical adverse event, sentinel event, near miss event, no harm event, and major 
event, the above events are defined as below. 
1. Medical adverse event: Injuries are not resulted from the existing disease, but a patient 
being physically injured, extended stay in the hospital, or appearing certain degree of 
disability, or even death, caused by medical behaviors when leaving the hospital.  
2. Sentinel event: It refers to the loss of permanent functions in an unexpected death and 
non-natural course of disease of a case, or the events of patient suicide, stealing infants, 
blood transfusion, and use of incompatible plasma components resulting in hemolysis, 
wrong recognition of patients or surgery parts, comorbidities during and after surgery, 
inadequate treatment, or giving a wrong baby to a family.  
3. Near miss: Accidents, injuries, or diseases which are expected to happen but do not really 
occur because of accidental or immediate interference.  





Based on the event characteristics, Taiwan Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation 
(TJCHA) classifies medical events into 13 subtypes. They are drug-related incidents, falling 
incidents, surgery-related incidents, blood transfusion incidents, medical procedure incidents, 
public accidents, law accidents, injurious behavior, endo-tube incidents, unexpected 
cardiopulmonary arrest, anesthesia incidents, laboratory incidents, and other incidents (shown 
as Table 6). These data are regularly published every year by MOHW, and the collected data is 
an indirect indicator to patient safety. We used this data to evaluate the effectiveness of SBAR 
intervention in the experimental hospital’s handoff. The duration of PSI data collection was 
from year 2006 to 2014. As mentioned earlier, year 2006 to 2010 was the first phase, we 
observed the outcome of patient safety from TPSR database in the control and experimental 
group, both of them did not use SBAR protocol in their handoff system during this phase. The 
second phase was the intervention of SBAR in the experimental group since year 2010, the 
control group did not made any change in its handoff system. We then observe and analyzed 
the PSI change of control, experimental and reference group from TPSR database. Based on 




Table 6 Type of patient safety indicator 
Indicators  Description 
PSI1 Drug-related incidents 
PSI2 Falling incidents 
PSI3 Surgery-related incidents 
PSI4 Blood transfusion incidents 
PSI5 Medical procedure incidents 
PSI6 Public accidents 
PSI7 Law accidents 
PSI8 Injurious behavior 
PSI9 Endo-tube incidents 
PSI10 Unexpected cardiopulmonary arrest 
PSI11 Anesthesia incidents 
PSI12 Laboratory incidents 





4.3.2 Procedure to report PSIs in hospitals 
When an incidental event took place in a hospital, the stepwise approach to report an 
emergent or major events are as follow:  
(1) Emergent or major events: 
Including sudden death or serious complication of patients resulted from medical treatment 
and administrative incidents resulting in serious results or requiring emergent processing. 
Reporting procedure: Immediately inform the Head of unit → Director of the department 
→ Medical dispute team & Deputy Superintendent → Superintendent. 
(2) General events: 
Report to the head of unit and input records to patient safety event reporting system → 
Director of department → Deputy superintendent → Superintendent. 
(3) Reporter: 
The employee (or the concerned party) in the hospital is responsible for incident reporting; 
a third party is also responsible to made such report when discovering the incident. 
(4) Reporting methods: 
Enter the patient safety event reporting webpage from patient safety event reporting system 
to file the report. An incident reporter should fill in the columns to report detail about the 
event, event content, and immediate actions taken after the incident. The head of unit 
should then fill in the columns of measure or method to prevent such incident from 




4.4 Definition of patient safety indicators  
In a hospital setting, there are many types of medical adverse events and errors caused by 
units or employees. They are classified and defined differently, thus we here clarify the adverse 
events / errors influencing patient safety directly from medical process that we used in this 
thesis. According the definition of Taiwan Patient Safety Reporting system (TPSR), events 
affecting patient safety include sentinel event, accident, incident, medical adverse event, no 
harm event, preventable event, adverse drug event, high-alert drugs and adverse drug reaction. 
The errors include medical error, medication error, near miss, active error, and latent error. 
Based on the classification from TPSR, there are thirteen types of incidents to be discussed, 
they are drug-related incidents, falling incidents, endo-tube incidents, injurious behavior, 
medical procedure incidents, laboratory incidents, law accidents, surgery-related incidents, 
public accidents, unexpected cardiopulmonary arrest, blood transfusion incidents, anesthesia 
incidents, and other incidents. The definition of each is shown in Table 7; each incident 
contains six aspects, they are listed as below. 
1. Basic information: Including the time and location of occurrence, person(s) affected, 
immediate response measures, degree of injury to patient (such as death, extremely severe, 
severe, moderate, mild, near miss, no harm, and cannot be determined). 
2. Incident content: Which includes the thirteen types of incident, the content is listed in 
Table 7, describing the incident occurred, reaction/response after occurrence, hospital 
standard operation, reason for occurrence, incident description, and possible causes. 
3. Medical treatment after incidents: Contains medications and treatments performed after 
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the incident (e.g bandages or ice applications, and diagnostic procedures such as X-rays). 
4. Method to prevent this type of incidents from recurring: Contains suggested methods or 
measurements for avoiding future recurrence of such incident (e.g education and training 
lessons, a change in medical care model, administrative procedure revisions, or 
communication with patients). 
5. Possibility of incident recurrence: The content should include predicted frequency, 
location, and severity of recurrence. 
6. Basic information of reporter: This information should include identity (i.e. physician or 
nurse), years of experience in current position, and other basic profile in current report. 
 
Table 7 Patient safety indicators from TPSR classification 
Code Adverse events Content of notification form 
PSI1 Drug-related incidents Stage at which error occurred, drug dosage form, drug name, 
reason for occurrence 
PSI2 Falling incidents Number of falls during the most recent year, assisting 
equipment use at time of fall, activity or process during 
which incident occurred, reason for occurrence 
PSI3 Surgery-related 
incidents 
Stage at which error occurred, surgery type, reason for 
occurrence 
PSI4 Blood transfusion 
incidents 
Stage at which error occurred, blood transfusion reaction 
induced after the incident, reason for occurrence 
PSI5 Medical procedure 
incidents 
During what type of medical procedure did the incident 
occur? Was it an invasive procedure? Error type and reason 
for occurrence 
PSI6 Public accidents Accidents occurred in public area, e.g. Lobby, our record 
include event type (i.e. Fire, mass food poisoning inside 
hospital) and reason for occurrence (e.g. Equipment, 
apparatus, or environmental factors) 
PSI7 Law accidents Accidents concern about security events (e.g. thief stealing 
money from inpatient). Our record includes event type (e.g. 
theft, patient missing, infant stolen, threat, violence, 
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harassment and aggression) and reason for occurrence 
PSI8 Injurious behavior Any behavior that results in a physical injury either to the 
patient or to another that is significant enough to warrant 
either medical treatment or diagnostic services 
PSI9 Endo-tube incidents State of patient when incident occurred (had patient received 
a sedative?), manner of tube loss, tube type, material used to 




Chronic disease history, reason for first aid, any 
cardiopulmonary arrest, return of spontaneous circulation, 
ultimate state at time leaving hospital 
PSI11 Anesthesia incidents The abnormal events during anesthesia 
PSI12 Laboratory incidents The abnormal events during inspection or other pathological 
processes 
PSI13 Other incidents Description of the entire incident, possible cause of incident 
Ps. the counting unit of PSI in TPSR system is the events not percentage, and the count period is from 
January to December for each year normally. 
 
4.5 To determine the injury degree by root cause analysis (RCA) 
In the TPSR system, the participant hospital not only reported their patient safety events 
but also presented the degree of injury caused by patient safety events directly or indirectly. 
Determination for the degree of injuries is a crucial problem in hospital. According to the rule 
of TPSR, the hospitals need to establish a root cause analysis (RCA) team for avoiding 
repetition of similar emergent or major incidents. The establishment of RCA team aims to 
formulate proper and specific improvement measures. This was achieved through knowledge 
and information exchange among cross-departmental members, stressing on the risks as well as 
drawbacks of operation process and system design, rather than personal responsibilities. In 
general, RCA members in Taiwan typically involves 10 supervisors, twice number of seed 
members plus an executive secretary to deal with case conditions in a medical institute with a 
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hospital scale of 500-1000 beds. The initiation principle and timing of RCA team are 
introduced as below. 
1. Start principle 
 Medical Adverse Event - Injuries are not a result from the existing diseases, but physical 
injuries of patients, extension of stays, certain disability when leaving the hospital, and 
death caused by medical behaviors. 
 Sentinel Event - Including unexpected death, permanent function loss in an unnatural 
process, patient committing suicide, babies being stolen, use of blood transfusion or 
incompatible plasma components resulting in hemolysis, misrecognition of patients or 
surgery site, co-morbidities during and after surgery, inadequate treatment, given wrong 
baby to the family. 
 Analysis of incident severity and re-occurrence according to Severity Assessment Code 
(SAC, shown in Table 8). Events classified as SAC levels 1 and 2 are considered to make 
immediate improvement actions, while SAC levels 3 and 4 are continuously monitored.  
 Judging with incident decision tree (IDT) to ensure the event caused by the system. 
 In the circumstance of special events, deputy director of medical quality and patient safety 
management unit as well as the executive secretary of RCA team should report to and 
request for agreement from the superintendent and deputy superintendent, or head of 
department to start the root cause analysis. 
Table 8 Severity assessment code (SAC) 
Frequency 
Injury degree 
Death Extremely severe Severe Moderate Mild No harm 
Several weeks 1 1 2 3 3 4 
Several times a year 1 1 2 3 4 4 
Once every 1-2 
years 1 2 2 3 4 4 
Once every 2-5 
years 1 2 3 4 4 4 
More than 5 years 2 3 3 4 4 4 
 
The definition for degree of injury in SAC table is described as below: 
 Death: Resulting in the death of patient. 
 Extremely severe: Causing permanent disability or dysfunction of a patient, such as 
physical disability and brain damage. 
 Severe: Events resulting in patient injuries, which require additional visit, evaluation, and 
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observation as well as operation, hospitalization, or extending stays in the hospital (e.g 
bone fracture or pneumothorax). 
 Moderate: Events resulting in patient injuries, which require additional visit, evaluation, 
observation, or processing (e.g measuring blood pressure, pulse, and blood sugar more than 
ordinal, X-ray, blood tests, urine analysis, wound dressing, stitching, hemostatic therapy, 
1~2 dose of medication.) 
 Mild: Events causing injuries, but do not need or require slight treatment, without 
additional care, such as red skin, scratch, and bruise. 
 No harm: Events occurring on patients, butdid not result in any injuries. 
2. Start timing  
 Superintendent level, deputy director of medical quality and patient safety management, or 
executive secretary of RCA team, will select events with high severity, high frequency, or 
necessary for overall investigation for the root cause analysis and make improvement. 
 When an event is confirmed to be assigned for RCA, director of medical quality and patient 
safety management unit would arrange an RCA team according to the event contents. The RCA 
team should interview the employee directly related to the event in the incident unit within 7 
days after confirming the root cause, then observe the environment, equipment, document, and 
operation procedure for the analysis evidence. 
 
4.6 Methods of statistical analysis 
Descriptive and analytic statistics were computed with the use of SPSS (version 20.0, 
Chicago, USA) for Windows. The descriptive statistics include frequencies, percentages, and 
means ( ± standard deviation (SD)) for qualifying participant hospital, PSIs and healthcare 
outcomes. The overall aims of this analysis were to compare the quality of patient care (via 
patient safety indicators) in caregiver’s handoffs before and after SBAR implementation. To 
aim 1 to 4, we first used a student t-test to compare the indicators of patient safety between 
experimental and control teams before adapting the SBAR tool in the handoff. To perform a 
student t-test, the null hypothesis, denoted by H0, is a statement about performing SBAR 
efficiently for caring patient safety. An alternative hypothesis (H1) is a statement that is 
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accepted if SBAR is inefficient and which indicates that the null hypothesis is false. Next, we 
used general estimation equation (GEE) to compare the quality of patient safety by time series 
in these timing. By application of GEE, we could analyze the effectiveness of SBAR on 
different running steps. For example, we can assess whether adapting SBAR into a hospital 
handoff enhances patient safety as well as its latent effects. The adverse events were retrieved 
from 2006 to 2014, and each incident was classified to one of the thirteen types of incidents, 
and we used these data to build our analysis model. 
4.7 Introduction to SBAR‟s steps and examples 
As health care has evolved and became more specialized, there are increased numbers of 
caregivers involved in the patient care. Patients have a greater chance to encounter more 
handoffs than in the simpler health care delivery system. Ineffective handoffs can contribute to 
gaps in patient care and breaches in patient safety, including medication errors, wrong-site 
surgery, and even patient deaths. Clinical environments are full of dynamic and complexity, 
presenting many challenges for effective communication among health care providers, patients, 
and families. Some nursing units may ―transfer or discharge up to 40~70 percent of their 
patients every day, therefore the improvement of handoff system in hospital units is critical for 
patient safety. The Joint Commission's stated Situation, Background, Assessment and 
Recommendation (SBAR) technique has become the industry’s best practice for standardized 
communication in healthcare; effortlessly structuring critical information primarily for spoken 
delivery. Regular use of SBAR is an important component of any health care organization, 
assisting caregivers to function as an effective team member while establishing a culture of 
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quality, patient safety and high reliability. We describe the intervention of SBAR below: 
 First step: 
Quickly organize the briefing information in your mind or on paper using the four elements 
(Situation, Background, Assessment and Recommendation) in sequence. Only the most 
relevant data is included, and everything irrelevant or of secondary importance is excluded. 
 Second step: 
Present your briefing. Since team members can immediately recognize and understand the 
familiar, predictable SBAR format, the presentation will help them more efficiently and 
effectively address a situation or solve a problem. 
 Third step: 
They may confirm, clarify or enhance what you’ve said, then work with you to take the 
required action. 
Here are the examples of SBAR applied in hospital’s OR, pre and post-anesthesia care unit 




Table 9 Elements of the preoperative to intraoperative handoff communication 
Situation  
 Name of patient and date of birth 
 Name of operative or invasive procedure to be performed including modifiers and site  
 Pertinent documents are present and consistent 
Background 
 Elements of patient history pertinent to surgery 
 Medical clearance 
 Patient allergies and NPO status 
 Patient’s vital signs and pain level  
 Medication profile and medications taken today 
 Specific laboratory results 
 Code status of patient 
Assessment 
 Patient’s current level of understanding of the surgery  
 Special patient needs or precautions  
 Pertinent aspects of the patient’s emotional and spiritual status 
 Pertinent cultural implications 
 Anesthesia requests 
Recommendations 
 State whether the patient has been seen preoperatively by the surgeon and anesthesia 
care provider 
 Determine whether the patient is ready for surgery 
 Allow an opportunity for preoperative and intraoperative staff members to ask 




Table 10 Elements of the intraoperative to pre-anesthesia care unit (PACU) handoff 
communication 
Situation 
 Name of patient and date of birth 
 Name of operative or invasive procedure  
 Performed procedures including modifiers and site 
Background 
 Type of anesthesia administered and name of anesthesia care provider 
 Intraoperative medications administered including dose and time  
 IV fluids administered 
 Estimated blood loss 
 Pertinent information related to the surgical site such as dressings, tubes, drains, or 
packing 
 Any significant OR events 
Assessment 
 Hemodynamic stability 
 Airway and oxygenation status 
 Thermal status (eg, presence of hypothermia or hyperthermia) 
 Urine output 
 Presence or absence of surgical complications 
 Level of pain 
 Method of pain management 
Recommendations 
 Ensure that immediate postoperative orders have been completed 
 Discharge from the PACU when stable 






Table 11 Elements of the post-anesthesia care unit (PACU) to inpatient unit hand-off 
communication 
Situation 
 Name of patient and date of birth 
 Name of operative or invasive procedure 
 Performed including modifiers and site 
Background 
 Type of anesthesia administered and name of anesthesia care provider 
 Medications administered in the OR and PACU including dose and time 
 IV fluids administered in the OR and PACU  
 Estimated blood loss 
 Pertinent information related to the surgical site such as dressings, tubes, drains, or 
packing 
 Any significant OR events 
 Any significant PACT events 
Assessment 
 Hemodynamic stability 
 Airway and oxygenation status 
 Thermal status (eg, presence of hypothermia or hyperthermia) 
 Urine output 
 Presence or absence of surgical complications 
 Level of pain 
 Method of pain management 
Recommendations 
 Ensure that the orders given by PACU physician have been completed 
 Ensure that the surgeon’s plan of care has been implemented 
 Identify patient’s and family members’ educational needs 
 Provide discharge instructions 
 Discharge after two hours or when stable 





4.8 Limitations and strengths 
We identified several limitations in this study and list them as below: 
1. Few case studies: the data collection was limited by the number of sample hospitals, 
making it difficult to achieve a systematic sampling of Taiwan’s hospitals. As such, the 
generalizability of the results remains limited to units and hospitals with the same attributes 
as those in our sample. 
2. The measurement of patient safety reported in this study was showed to be a proxy measure 
only. While there was an increase in the reported number of incidents and near misses, the 
numbers from the study period were quite small and may not be significant. 
3. The results may not be an absolute accurate reflection of actual incidents at individual 
medical organizations. Similarly, the number of incidents in the nationwide database was 
not exactly the same as the number of incidents at all participating hospitals. We assume 
that the reason for the discrepancy in numbers of incidents is due to under-reporting of 
hospital organizations. 
4. The culprits for event of patient safety are not only limited by communication skill in the 
handoff system. Other factors such as medical technology, level of disease, caring quality 
etc. may also affect the safety of patient. Therefore in this study, we used a 




This study also had several strengths: 
1. This is the first study of SBAR in Taiwan’s hospital: The study has several important 
elements that have never been previously studied, including the use of the SBAR tool for 
studying the handoff effectiveness in hospitals, and the study of both the traditional and 
SBAR handoff approaches. 
2. Significance: It is hoped that the study results will help the participating units to identify 
the problems in the handoff system and thereby lessen the frequency of mistakes and errors 
that might impinge on patient safety. 
3. As part of the study, we found some barriers to effective team communications. In order to 
communicate more effectively and efficiently within and various teams, tools such as 
SBAR, call-out, check-back, and handoff were introduced. The end result of an improved 
communication allows a safer patient care environment. 
4. The development of trust and shared thinking models has facilitated effective 
communication, enabling the teams to quickly adapt to change in situations. 
Communication is particularly important as healthcare environments become more 
complex (for example, in emergency situations). Effective communication provides 
necessary information to other team members and facilitates the continual updates about a 




4.9 Privacy Protection 
Human subject protection review and approval was obtained from the Institutional Review 
Board of Taipei City Hospital. All participants were provided with a study disclaimer form that 
incorporated all the basic elements of informed consent per regulatory guidelines. Participants’ 
names were not collected, and all handoffs were identified by an anonymous code for reporting 




5.1 Descriptive statistics of patient safety events 
5.1.1 Annual reporting of patient safety events from TPSR system 
According to the data collected from TPSR system (figure 2), there were 171 hospitals 
registered in TPSR system since 2006 to report their PSEs. The trend increased over years, till 
the end of year 2014, there were 664 hospitals included. The hospitals include medical center, 
teaching hospital, regional hospital, and others (including psychiatric hospital, nursing house 
and partial clinics). The analysis of reporting data from different hospital type is listed in Table 
12. Here we can find the average of PSEs based on the scale of hospital. In medical centers the 
total average was more than metropolitan and regional hospitals every year since 2006. This is 
due to the hospital accreditation system in Taiwan; the most frequent indicator of hospital 
accreditation is patient safety, along with time, more events of patient safety incidents (PSI) 
were disclosed and reported. In hospitals reporting the issue of PSI, the environment become 
more transparent than ever; therefore the curve went up significantly. Till the end of 2014, the 
mean of PSI was 910, 318.9, 43.3 and 19 to medical center, metropolitan hospital, regional 
hospital, and others, respectively.  Based on the dataset, the key point to prevent increase in 
PSI is to reduce the events in medical center or large hospital via education or training system 
for patient safety. The comparison between experimental group, control group and TPSR 
system is shown in figure 3.  Here the annual data was chosen from the metropolitan 
hospitals database within the TPSR system (MTPSR) and compared to each other. The result 
showed that in the experimental group with SBAR handoff system, PSI was significantly 
reduced since 2010 when compared to the control group and MTPSR system. Additionally, the 
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ratio of hospitals with SBAR handoff system had fifty percent more to implement in this year. 
The result suggests the effectiveness of SBAR handoff system was a key intervention for 
enhancing patient safety, and we found that the effectiveness was reinforced by the period of 
SBAR operation. 
 
Figure 2 statistic data of patient safety events from TPSR system 
 
 
Table 12 analysis of patient safety events from different hospital type  
 
Ps1. ―num‖ is the hospital number 
Ps2. ―events‖ is defined from the table 11 
Ps3. ―mean‖ is equal to ―events/num‖ 
 
Num Events mean Num Events mean Num Events mean Num Events mean Num Events mean
2006 9 1,394 155 44 4,679 106.3 101 1,745 17.3 17 358 21.1 171 8,176 48
2007 17 3,492 205 47 5,245 111.6 112 3,638 32.5 23 3000 130 199 15,375 77
2008 17 9,085 534 55 7,279 132.3 146 6,388 43.8 30 1036 34.5 248 23,788 96
2009 17 9,478 558 56 10,638 190 181 8,180 45.2 39 6691 172 293 34,987 119
2010 21 15,894 757 66 15,464 234.3 287 12,644 44.1 178 2699 15.2 552 46,701 85
2011 20 15,326 766 66 19,334 292.9 326 13,541 41.5 219 6981 31.9 631 55,182 87
2012 20 17,180 859 78 23,001 294.9 336 11,920 35.5 264 9073 34.4 698 61,174 88
2013 20 18,182 909 77 24,800 322.1 301 12,774 42.4 257 3340 13 655 59,096 90
2014 20 18,208 910 78 24,878 318.9 278 12,045 43.3 286 5428 19 662 60,559 91





Figure 3 To compare annual data between hospitals 
(Ps.SBAR% is the ratio of ―hospital number with SBAR/total hospital‖ in the same hospital level) 
 
5.1.2 The analysis of patient safety events in a hospital without SBAR implementation 
The event analysis of PSI in control group (hospital B) is shown in Table 13. The number 
of events increased from 110 to 305 since year 2006 to 2014. We calculated the average 
number of PSI occurrence, which was also increasing, from the beginning on2006 being 9.2 
events per month, to the end of 2014 being 25.4 events per month. This means that the events 
of patient safety in hospital did not slow down over the past nine years (2006 to 2014). It is a 
critical issue to prevent this kind of events to increase, as it putpatient safety at risk and injures 
caring quality. Therefore, to devise an effective action or policy in hospital to prevent growth 
of these events is important. Additionally, we looked into the percentage of TPSR report, where 
it showed a decrease from 1.35% to 0.5%. In the annual report, the total number of patient 
safety events from TPSR also had an increasing trend. The reported events of patient safety 
serve as the outcome of caring quality and the accreditation indicator of hospital. On average, 
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there were approximately twenty events per month after 2010.  
Table 13 the occurrence analysis of PSI in control group 
Year 
M(month) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 5 6 11 8 13 31 20 26 29 
2 11 6 17 10 16 16 23 23 31 
3 6 17 10 11 22 33 24 25 20 
4 7 5 18 16 24 13 49 9 21 
5 15 7 12 16 13 16 25 24 31 
6 10 3 4 16 25 17 31 20 26 
7 13 12 14 14 13 33 19 28 20 
8 11 4 8 18 24 20 24 28 32 
9 12 8 18 23 16 24 23 25 27 
10 9 14 8 16 28 22 22 29 22 
11 7 11 9 22 22 20 21 24 24 
12 4 15 5 18 18 43 17 49 22 
Total 110 108 134 188 234 288 298 310 305 
Mean (N/M) 9.2 9.0 11.2 15.7 19.5 24.0 24.8 25.8 25.4 
std 3.41 4.65 4.78 4.48 5.30 9.08 8.38 8.99 4.52 
% in TPSR 1.35% 0.70% 0.56% 0.54% 0.50% 0.52% 0.49% 0.52% 0.50% 
Ps1. the calculation of ―Mean‖ is the annual total PSI number divided by twelve months, e.g. 110/12=9.2 in year 2006 
Ps2. The calculation of ―%in TPSR‖ is the annual total PSI number in control group divided by the annual total PSI number in 
TPSR reporting system, e.g. 110/8176=13.5% in the year 2006 
 
5.1.3 The analysis of patient safety events in a hospital with SBAR implementation 
The event analysis of PSI in experimental group (hospital A) is shown in Table 14. The 
number of events increased from 100 to 130 since 2006 to 2014. Mean of PSI was 8.3 and 10.8 
events per month for 2006 and 2014, which also showed an increasing trend if we only look at 
the beginning and the end. However, this increasing trend needs consist of two 
phase/components and need to be interpreted individually. The first phase was from the year 
2006 to 2010, where the mean of PSI increased from 8.3 to 18.8 events per month. In the 
second phase (2010 to 2014), the PSI decreased from 18.8 to 10.8 events per month. In this 
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group, intervention of SBAR protocol was used in handoff system by the medical team 
members since 2010. As mentioned above, the peak incident of patient events in this hospital 
took place in 2010, and showed a decreasing trend until the end of 2014. The percentage 
change of TPSR in this group decreased from 1.22% in 2006 to 0.48% in 2010 then to 0.21% 
in 2014. Just by looking at the change of percentage throughout the whole study period in this 
hospital, a biphasic change was not present, masking the effect of SBAR intervention in patient 
safety prevention. However, if this data was compared to the control group, a difference can be 
noted.  
Table 14 the occurrence analysis of PSI in experimental group 
Year 
M(month) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 12 8 10 18 22 8 19 17 5 
2 9 10 8 12 16 18 20 9 9 
3 6 11 16 19 13 22 9 15 4 
4 9 9 9 10 18 27 14 7 11 
5 9 7 9 18 23 21 18 11 17 
6 9 9 16 16 20 17 13 16 11 
7 7 10 9 15 23 16 15 8 7 
8 8 8 14 16 20 11 12 9 14 
9 7 11 8 12 25 22 11 16 11 
10 8 8 10 10 18 13 22 8 14 
11 8 7 9 12 7 11 21 16 7 
12 8 7 10 22 20 24 16 18 20 
Total 100 105 128 180 225 210 190 150 130 
Mean (N/M) 8.3 8.8 10.7 15.0 18.8 17.5 15.8 12.5 10.8 
std 1.50 1.48 2.93 3.84 4.96 5.90 4.20 4.17 4.82 
% in TPSR 1.22% 0.68% 0.54% 0.51% 0.48% 0.38% 0.31% 0.25% 0.21% 
Ps1. the calculation of ―Mean‖ is the annual total PSI number divided by twelve months, e.g. 100/12=8.3 in the year 2006 
Ps2. The calculation of ―%in TPSR‖ is the annual total PSI number in experimental group divided by the annual total PSI 




5.1.4 The analysis of patient safety events in the hospitals included in TPSR 
The event analysis of PSI in reference group is shown in Table 15. The number of events 
increased from 8,176 in 2006 to 60,559 in 2014. We calculated the mean of PSI per month and 
an increasing trend was found from the beginning of 2006 (681.3 events per month) to the end 
of 2014 (5,046.6 events per month). Both the PSI and percentage change showed an liner 
increase from 2006 to 2014. This is associated with the increase in numbers of hospital 
reporting to TPSR, with 171 hospitals in 2006 and 664 hospitals in 2014. Additionally, the 
events per month increase from 47.81 in 2006 to 91.20 in 2014. The data reveals a relatively 
linear growth of patient safety events from 2006 to 2014, with a spike in 2009. The reason for 
this spike is unclear, however, the data clearly provides a platform for us to analyze the causes 
and injuries of the PSEs, and hopefully allow us to come up with a better method to prevent 
PSE. 
Table 15 the occurrence analysis of PSI in reference group 
Year 
M(month) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 624 1448 2284 2603 4165 4415 5661 4147 5155 
2 730 1383 2199 3122 3924 4388 4742 5927 5316 
3 693 1145 2096 2564 4064 4573 5761 5000 5089 
4 709 936 3274 3714 3353 2878 5662 4112 4636 
5 688 1396 2273 3239 3934 4848 4936 6385 6721 
6 729 1482 1515 2816 4047 6250 4101 3843 5504 
7 732 1178 1137 2805 3831 4304 5551 6076 3672 
8 601 1232 2231 3586 4127 4562 4904 4151 4740 
9 671 1387 1847 2624 4078 4860 4450 5076 3762 
10 709 1061 2031 2528 3388 5471 5372 4924 4526 
11 646 1093 1270 2850 3460 4281 4909 3974 4432 
12 644 1634 1631 2536 4330 4352 5125 5481 7006 
Total 8,176 15,375 23,788 34,987 46,701 55,182 61,174 59,096 60,559 
Mean (N/M) 681.3 1281.3 1982.3 2915.6 3891.8 4598.5 5097.8 4924.7 5046.6 





171 199 248 293 553 631 698 655 664 
N/(h*M) 47.81 77.26 95.92 119.41 84.45 87.45 87.64 90.22 91.20 
 
Ps1. the calculation of ―Mean‖ is the annual total PSI number divided by twelve months, e.g. 8,176/12=681.3 in the year 2006 
Ps2. The calculation of ―N/(h*M)‖ is the annual total PSI number in TPSR system divided by the (hospitals in TPSR system* 
12 months), e.g. 8,176/(171*12)=47.81 in the year 2006 
 
5.2 To analyze the SBAR handoff system effect on hospital PSI 
In this section, we discuss the effect of SBAR handoff system on hospital’s patient safety. 
The experimental group operated SBAR protocol for handoff system since 2010, therefore, we 
chose 2009 as a reference/baseline for PSI analysis, year 2010, 2012 and 2014 served as the 
first, second and third post-test, respectively. The descriptive data is shown in Table 16, and 
pair t test was used as the statistic test to investigate the effectiveness of SBAR. The statistic 
test result is analyzed in the following section. 





2009 2010 2012 2014 2009 2010 2012 2014 
Pre Post1 Post2 Post3 Pre Post1 Post2 Post3 
1 18 22 19 5 8 13 20 29 
2 12 16 20 9 10 16 23 31 
3 19 13 9 4 11 22 24 20 
4 10 18 14 11 16 24 49 21 
5 18 23 18 17 16 13 25 31 
6 16 20 13 11 16 25 31 26 
7 15 23 15 7 14 13 19 20 
8 16 20 12 14 18 24 24 32 
9 12 25 11 11 23 16 23 27 
10 10 18 22 14 16 28 22 22 
11 12 7 21 7 22 22 21 24 
12 22 20 16 20 18 18 17 22 
Total 180  225  190  130  188  234  298  305  
Mean 15.0 18.8 15.8 10.8 15.7 19.5 24.8 25.4 
STD 3.84 4.96 4.20 4.82 4.48 5.30 8.38 4.52 
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Ps1. the calculation of ―Mean‖ is the annual total PSI number divided by twelve months, e.g. 180/12=15.0 in the 
year 2009 
 
6.1.1 To test the effectiveness of SBAR intervention with statistic on patient safety 
Table 17 is the result of independent t test for testing the effectiveness of SBAR 
intervention in patient safety. Year 2009 was used as the baseline in the control and 
experimental group, comparing to year 2010 (the implementation year of SBAR used in 
handoff system), 2012 and 2014. When comparing 2009 to 2010, no significant difference was 
shown between experimental and control group (Aim 1 and 2), both groups showed no 
difference in the change of patient safety events by the mean of statistic analysis. After three 
and five years of SBAR implementation, we can find a significant difference between the 
experimental and control group. The experimental group had a decrease of 9 and 14.58 PSI 
events on 2012 and 2014 year (Aim 3 and 4) from the baseline, respectively. If we test the 
change of experimental group only (Aim 5-7), we found a significant difference between 2009 
and 2014 (Aim 7), suggesting the disclosure of patient safety event is more effective in 
avoiding PSI. In contrast, the control group had a significant escalating trend (Aim 5A-7A) by 
years. Based on the statistic result, the implementation of SBAR in handoff system in hospital 
is an effective method to reduce patient safety events. 
 
Table 17 The student t-test in handoff system with/without SBAR protocol applying 
Year Aim 
Patient Safety Events (per year) 




2009 Aim 1 15.7/4.48 15.0/3.84 -0.392 0.699 
2010 Aim 2 19.5/5.30 18.8/4.96 -0.358 0.724 
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2012 Aim 3 24.8/8.37 15.8/4.19 -3.328 0.003** 




Table 18 The test result for using SBAR protocol in handoff system by pair t test 




































-9.750 6.580 1.899 -13.931 -5.569 -5.133 11 .000 
 
5.2.2 To estimate the trend of PSI by used with or without SBAR protocol in hospital 
The generalized estimating equation (GEE) was used to test the timing effectiveness with 
or without SBAR handoff system; the results are shown in Table 19-23. The pre-test 
(2006-2010) is shown in Table 19; no significant difference existed in the control and 
experimental group. The absence of significant change in PSI could be explained by the fact 
that both groups didn’t use the SBAR protocol in their handoff system during this period. After 
three years (2012) of SBAR intervention in the experimental group, the result of comparison is 
shown in Table 20. The PSI trend of control group is significantly higher than that of 
experimental group as shown by GEE test. We can also estimate the trend of PSI via equation 
(1) in both control and experimental group. The whole study period (2006 to 2014) was also 
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tested with the results presented in Table 21; this result revealed the effectiveness of SBAR 
after five years of SBAR application. The trend of PSI in the experimental group was 
significantly lower than the control group, and the estimation can be calculated via equation 
(2). The result suggests that application of SBAR protocol in a hospital’s handoff system can 
significantly reduce PSI if SBAR protocol was previously not used. Additionally, we also 
compared the trend of PSI between the experimental and reference group (as shown in Table 
22). The PSI data of the reference group was collected from nationwide; therefore allowing us 
to study the difference existing in the national PSI data. The result showed a significant change, 
and the trend of PSI can be calculated by equation (3) for reference and experimental group. 
Table 23 is the comparison of control and reference group. The data of PSI in the reference 
group is collected from many hospitals’ handoff system, with or without SBAR protocol. The 
trend of PSI in reference group showed absence of significant difference from the control 
group, suggesting that the tendency of reference (TPSR) and control group had no significant 
difference. In contrast, PSI trend of the experimental group is significantly lower than the 
reference group (TPSR), we can assume and suggest that this difference was due to the 




Table 19 Parameter estimation of control and experimental group by GEE on pretest 
period (2006-2010) 
Parameter B Std. 
Error 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Lower Upper Wald 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
(Intercept) 50.369 2.5420 45.387 55.352 392.613 1 .000 
[Group=0] 1.663 3.5950 -5.384 8.709 .214 1 .644
a
 
[Group=1] 0 . . . . . . 
BaseLine 0       
Repeat 42.937 .9659 41.044 44.830 1976.176 1 .000 
[Group=0] * 
Repeat 





0 . . . . . . 
(Scale) 101.031       
Dependent Variable: PSI 
Group: control group=0; experimental group=1 
Model: (Intercept), Group, Repeat(year 2007-2010), Group * Repeat 
a. No significant difference between control and experimental group during year 2006 to 2010 






Table 20 Parameter estimation of experimental and control group by GEE (2006-2012) 
Parameter B Std. 
Error 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Lower Upper Wald 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
(Intercept) 121.879 6.5073 109.125 134.633 350.801 1 .000 
[Group=0] -48.012 9.2027 -66.049 -29.975 27.219 1 .000 
[Group=1] 0
a
 . . . . . . 
BaseLine 0
a
 . . . . . . 
Repeat 17.349 1.7019 14.014 20.685 103.918 1 .000 
[Group=0] * 
Repeat 





 . . . . . . 
(Scale) 693.089       
Dependent Variable: PSI, Group: control group=0; experimental group=1 
Model: (Intercept), Group, BaseLine(2006), Repeat(year 2007-2012), Group * Repeat 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
 
PSI = -121.88 – 48.0 * Group +17.35 * Repeat + 20.68 * Group * Repeat---------(1) 
 
Table 21 Parameter estimation of experimental and control group by GEE (2006-2014) 
Parameter B Std. 
Error 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Lower Upper Wald 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
(Intercept) 152.480 9.8730 133.129 171.830 238.518 1 .000 
[Group=0] -48.910 13.9626 -76.276 -21.544 12.270 1 .000 
[Group=1] 0
a
 . . . . . . 
BaseLine 0
a
 . . . . . . 
Repeat 3.578 2.3289 -.986 8.143 2.361 1 .124 
[Group=0] * 
Repeat 





 . . . . . . 
(Scale) 1579.319       
Dependent Variable: PSI, Group: control group=0; experimental group=1 
Model: (Intercept), Group, BaseLine(2006), Repeat(year 2007-2014), Group * Repeat 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
 
PSI = 152.5 – 48.9 * Group-3.58 * Repeat + 25.3 * Group * Repeat---------(2) 
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Table 22 Parameter estimation of experimental and reference group by GEE (2006-2014) 
Parameter B Std. 
Error 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Lower Upper Wald 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
(Intercept) 152.480 9.8730 133.129 171.830 238.518 1 .000 
[Group=0] -48.910 13.9626 -76.276 -21.544 12.270 1 .000 
[Group=1] 0
a
 . . . . . . 
BaseLine 0
a
 . . . . . . 
Repeat 3.578 2.3289 -.986 8.143 2.361 1 .124 
[Group=0] * 
Repeat 





 . . . . . . 
(Scale) 1579.319       
Dependent Variable: PSI, Group: reference group=0; experimental group=1 
Model: (Intercept), Group, BaseLine(2006), Repeat(year 2007-2014),, Group * Repeat 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
 
PSI = 152.5 – 48.9 *Group -3.58 * Repeat + 25.28 * Group * Repeat-----------(3) 
 
Table 23 Parameter estimation of control and reference group by GEE (2006-2014) 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Lower Upper Wald 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
(Intercept) 79.868 181.1395 -275.159 434.895 .194 1 .659 
[Group=0] 8842.930 13282.4623 -17190.217 34876.078 .443 1 .506 
[Group=1] 0
a
 . . . . . . 
BaseLine 0
a
 . . . . . . 
Repeat 28.143 .0000 28.143 28.143 . 1 .000 
[Group=0] * 
Repeat 





 . . . . . . 
(Scale) 49587307.253       
Dependent Variable: PSI 
Group: reference group=0; control group=1 
Model: (Intercept), Group, BaseLine(2006), Repeat(year 2007-2014),, Group * Repeat 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
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6.3 To analyze the thirteen indicators of patient safety effected by used with or 
without SBAR protocol 
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of SBAR handoff system in hospitalusing the 
thirteen indicators (PSI) as mentioned earlier. The tested groups include the control group 
(without SBAR intervention), experimental group (with SBAR intervention) and the TPSR 
reference group (with and without SBAR intervention), the results of SBAR intervention in 
these groups is presented below. 
6.3.1 Analysis of the thirteen PSIs 
The thirteen patient safety indicators in hospital without SBAR implementation are listed in 
Table 23 by total number of incidents and its percentage of total incident in each year. The top 
three PSIs are the drug-related incidents (PSI 1), falling incidents (PSI 2) and endo-tube 
incidents (PSI 9). These three indicators are also the one causing most of the patient safety 
events in hospitals generally, additionally, they commonly induce patient injuries and 
complications. The data reveals that the ratio did not change a lot, but the case number is 
rapidly increased by years. Before 2010, the reporting number is low, this could be due to two 
reasons, the first beign that PSI 5 and PSI 7 were not included in the index of patient safety in 
hospital before 2010. The second is due to the change in environmental setting, where 
incidents in hospital related to patient safety is required reported. Therefore as the years 
increased, the total PSI showed an increasing trend from 110 incidents in 2006 to 305 incidents 




Table 24 The trend of PSI to a hospital without SBAR hand-off system 
Ctrl. group Years 




26 34 42 50 68 84 95 98 93 
23.64% 31.48% 31.34% 26.60% 29.06% 29.17% 31.88% 31.61% 30.49% 
PSI2 Falling incidents 
20 20 38 48 58 44 71 58 60 




6 4 4 8 11 11 0 4 8 





5 4 4 8 5 11 9 6 9 





0 0 0 0 0 5 2 4 5 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.74% 0.67% 1.29% 1.64% 
PSI6 Public accidents 
6 4 1 4 5 10 6 12 7 
5.45% 3.70% 0.75% 2.13% 2.14% 3.47% 2.01% 3.87% 2.30% 
PSI7 Law accidents 
0 0 0 0 0 8 3 4 12 




10 10 10 15 22 20 30 29 21 




16 15 12 25 28 46 44 39 41 





6 4 5 8 11 10 7 8 12 




4 2 3 7 7 11 6 14 8 




7 7 9 7 12 20 18 21 21 
6.36% 6.48% 6.72% 3.72% 5.13% 6.94% 6.04% 6.77% 6.89% 
PSI13 Other incidents 
4 4 6 8 7 8 7 13 8 
4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 4% 3% 
Total 
110 108 134 188 234 288 298 310 305 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 




Table 25 is the data of PSIs distribution in the experimental group. The table reveals the 
top three indicators are the drug-related incidents (PSI 1), falling incidents (PSI 2) and 
endo-tube incidents (PSI 9). Something worth mention in this data is the indicators of public 
accidents (PSI 6), anesthesia incidents (PSI 11) and laboratory incidents (PSI 12). The above 
mentioned three indicators showed a gradual increase disregarding intervention of SBAR 
protocol in their handoff system for medical team, there were an increase in total PSI number, 
approximately by 30% when using 2006 as the baseline.  As previously described, the law 
accident (PSI 7) was not included in the index before year 2010, thus no data is available.  
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Table 25 The trend of PSI to a hospital with SBAR hand-off system 
Exp. group Years 




53 46 66 98 115 102 92 57 50 
53.00% 43.81% 51.56% 54.44% 51.11% 48.57% 48.42% 38.00% 38.46% 
PSI2 Falling incidents 
7 10 8 13 19 4 5 5 14 




1 2 4 3 6 10 7 6 6 
1.00% 1.90% 3.13% 1.67% 2.67% 4.76% 3.68% 4.00% 4.62% 
PSI4 Blood transfusion 
3 2 4 2 6 8 8 13 4 





2 2 2 2 2 5 5 2 2 
2.00% 1.90% 1.56% 1.11% 0.89% 2.38% 2.63% 1.33% 1.54% 
PSI6 Public accidents 
1 2 3 5 7 8 10 6 8 
1.00% 1.90% 2.34% 2.78% 3.11% 3.81% 5.26% 4.00% 6.15% 
PSI7 Law accidents 
0 0 0 0 0 10 8 4 3 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.76% 4.21% 2.67% 2.31% 
PSI8 Injurious behavior 
6 6 8 12 12 6 7 8 6 




18 19 18 27 30 15 14 10 8 





0 6 2 1 6 10 10 11 6 




1 1 2 2 8 11 7 9 8 




8 7 6 11 9 9 8 11 8 
8.00% 6.67% 4.69% 6.11% 4.00% 4.29% 4.21% 7.33% 6.15% 
PSI13 Other incidents 
0 2 5 4 5 12 9 8 7 
0% 2% 4% 2% 2% 6% 5% 5% 5% 
Total 100 105 128 180 225 210 190 150 130 




In this study, we also collected data from TPSR system for investigating the difference 
between control, experimental and TPSR reference group. The result of TPSR is presented in 
Table 26, with the top three indicators of PSI being the drug-related incidents (PSI1), falling 
incidents (PSI2), and endo-tube incidents (PSI 9). This ranking is the same as that of the 
control and experimental group. Here we pointed out two interesting trends worth further 
discussion. The first one is the injurious behavior (PSI 8) showing a declining trend in ratio 
with an increase in total number of events. Injurious behavior was defined to include any 
behavior that results in a physical injury either to the patient or to another that is significant 
enough to warrant either medical treatment or diagnostic services. The second one is the 
laboratory incidents (PSI 12), both the ratio and the total number of event showed an 
increasing trend; we define the laboratory incidents that included abnormal events during 
inspection or other pathological processes. Additionally, the total amount of all indicators in 
2014 was 7.4 times more than that of 2006; this could be explained by the increase in the 




Table 26 the trend of PSI from TPSR system 
TPSR group Years 




937 1339 3641 4793 8158 9201 12639 12493 13196 
11.46% 8.71% 15.31% 13.70% 17.47% 16.67% 20.66% 21.14% 21.79% 
PSI2 Falling incidents 
1398 2274 2929 5119 6734 8635 9412 11093 12330 




406 1104 1476 2147 2344 2526 2953 2092 2309 





460 758 1311 2053 2273 2582 2711 2107 2001 





682 1458 1851 1121 1559 1540 1971 1943 1922 
8.34% 9.48% 7.78% 3.20% 3.34% 2.79% 3.22% 3.29% 3.17% 
PSI6 Public accidents 
406 785 1304 2061 2216 2638 2757 2268 2254 
4.97% 5.11% 5.48% 5.89% 4.75% 4.78% 4.51% 3.84% 3.72% 
PSI7 Law accidents 
368 702 907 1385 1861 2695 2330 1991 2076 




934 1434 1668 2342 3219 3741 4182 4012 3782 




990 2525 3767 5479 8139 9236 9160 9900 9610 





447 803 1228 2243 2355 2617 2879 2117 2269 




491 716 1445 2073 2242 2733 3084 2227 2150 




219 747 960 2177 3370 4016 4301 4713 4464 
2.68% 4.86% 4.04% 6.22% 7.22% 7.28% 7.03% 7.98% 7.37% 
PSI13 Other incidents 
438 730 1301 1994 2231 3022 2795 2140 2196 
5% 5% 5% 6% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 
Total 
8176 15375 23788 34987 46701 55182 61174 59096 60559 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 




6.3.2 Comparison of the change in PSI with and without SBAR interevention 
Wepresent the data collected from Metropolitan hospital in TPSR from 2006 to 2014 (listed 
in Table 27) and calculated the percentage ratio of control and experimental group in MTPSR. 
The percentage curve is shown in figure 4; even though both group showed a gradual decline 
in trend, in year 2010, the experimental group showed a more rapid decline comparing to the 
control group. The decrease of slope in experimental and control group was -0.22 % and 
-0.14% per year, respectively. Till the end of 2014, the total PSI in the control and experimental 
group is 2.77 and 1.3 times comparing to 2006. The percentage of PSI in the control group 
(1.2%) is the 2.4 fold more than that of experimental group. The data support the hypothesis 
that by using the SBAR protocol in a hospital’s handoff system can be effective to avoid 
patient safety events. Pair-t test was used to analyze the difference between control and the 
experimental group (Table 28). The showed no significant difference in the pre-test of control 
vs experimental group. However after application of SBAR protocol in the experimental group, 
a significant improvement in patient safety was noted. 
 
Table 27 PSI change before and after SBAR implement 
Year N TPSR Mean Control PSI % Experimental PSI % 
2006 44 4,679 106 110 2.4% 100 2.1% 
2007 47 5,245 112 108 2.1% 105 2.0% 
2008 55 7,279 132 134 1.8% 128 1.8% 
2009 56 10,638 190 188 1.8% 180 1.7% 
2010 66 15,464 234 234 1.5% 225 1.5% 
2011 66 19,334 293 288 1.5% 210 1.1% 
2012 78 23,001 295 298 1.3% 190 0.8% 
2013 77 24,800 322 310 1.3% 150 0.6% 
2014 78 24,878 319 305 1.2% 130 0.5% 
Ps1. ―mean‖ calculated by TPSR/N, e.g. 4,679/44 =106 in year 2006 







Figure 4. Percentage change of PSI in a hospital with/without SBAR implementation 
 
Table 28 Pair t test on hospital with or without SBAR implementation 
Intervention 
Pre-test (2006-2009) Post-test (2010-2014) 
P 
mean std mean std 
SBAR(+) 2.00% 0.21% 1.90% 0.21% 0.000 
SBAR(-) 1.32% 0.38% 0.90% 0.38% 0.003 
P 0.058 0.016   
 
 
6.4 To analyze PSI by communication errors 
In this study, we performed an analysis regarding PSI events caused by communication 
errors in the hospital. Table 29 to 31 is the analysis of control group, experimental group and 
reference group by communication errors. Communication errors includes the following four 
subtypes: (1) communications that were too late to be effective, (2) failure to communicate 
with all the relevant individuals on the team, (3) content that was not complete and accurate 
SBAR (-) E:SBAR(+); C:SBAR (-) 
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consistently, and (4) communications whose purposes were not achieved—i.e., issues were left 
unresolved until the point of urgency. The SBAR intervention  aimed to improve patient 
safety and outcome via integrating collaboration between teams and units. This includes open 
communication, shared responsibilities for planning and problem solving, shared decision 
making, and coordination. In the following sections, we present the PSI data caused by 
communication errors. 
 
6.4.1 Analysis of PSI induced by communication errors in control group 
PSI induced by communication errors is presented in Table 29. The endo-tube incident 
(PSI 9) is the most common incident affected by communication errors. This was also found to 
be the most common indicated cause of critical incidents followed by insufficient 
communication between medical team staffs. The second most common affected indicator is 
PSI 8 (Injurious behavior). In general, injurious (including parasuicidal, suicidal and 
self-injuries) behavior occurs in three common situations: 1) behavioral complication of mental 
retardation, 2) as a symptom of Cluster B personality disorders, and 3) suicidality associated 
with depression (1) and (2). A proper communication skill by medical team is important in 
preventing this type of disorder behavior. Lastly, is drug related incidents, according to our 
study in Taiwan’s hospital environment, drug-related incidents occurs most frequently during 
8-10 am and 2-4 pm. The above mentioned time period is also the time for visiting staff to 
perform their clinical round. Therefore, reducing and avoiding this kind of incident via team 




Table 29 to analyze PSI by communication errors in control group 
Ctrl group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total 110 108 134 188 234 288 298 310 305 
PSI1 
3 1 2 4 5 4 5 5 5 
2.73% 0.93% 1.49% 2.13% 2.14% 1.39% 1.68% 1.61% 1.64% 
PSI3 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
0.91% 0.93% 0.75% 0.53% 0.43% 0.35% 0.34% 0.65% 0.66% 
PSI4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PSI5 
1 2 2 2 4 5 3 4 2 
0.91% 1.85% 1.49% 1.06% 1.71% 1.74% 1.01% 1.29% 0.66% 
PSI8 
4 3 3 5 7 7 9 6 7 
3.64% 2.78% 2.24% 2.66% 2.99% 2.43% 3.02% 1.94% 2.30% 
PSI9 
5 4 6 8 8 8 10 14 14 
4.55% 3.70% 4.48% 4.26% 3.42% 2.78% 3.36% 4.52% 4.59% 
PSI10 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PSI11 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PSI12 
0 1 1 1 2 3 1 3 1 
0.00% 0.93% 0.75% 0.53% 0.85% 1.04% 0.34% 0.97% 0.33% 
Number 14 12 15 21 27 28 29 34 31 
% 12.73% 11.11% 11.19% 11.17% 11.54% 9.72% 9.73% 10.97% 10.16% 




6.4.2 Analysis of PSI induced by communication errors in experimental group 
In the experimental group, we analyzed the effect of SBAR protocol in handoff system. 
The result is shown in Table 30. Both the injurious behaviors (PSI 8)endo-tube and endo-tube 
incidents (PSI 9) showed a significant drop in the ratio as well as the total number of incidents 
since 2010. All the other indicators of PSI induced by communication error also showed a 
declining trend after the implementation of SBAR protocol to the medical team, including 
physician, nurse, pharmacist, medical technologist, physical therapist, administration staff, 
patient and patient family etc… SBAR protocol is an important communication tool by 
systematic review and provided an additional measure in the caring status of patient within 
patient and medical staffs. From the table, one can see that at the end of the study (2014), the 
percentage of the adverse events was reduced by 5 to 10% when compared to the beginning of 




Table 30 to analyze PSI by communication errors in experimental group 
Exp group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total 100 105 128 180 225 210 190 150 130 
PSI1 
1 2 3 7 2 0 1 1 1 
1.00% 1.90% 2.34% 3.89% 0.89% 0.00% 0.53% 0.67% 0.77% 
PSI3 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.56% 0.44% 0.48% 0.53% 0.00% 0.00% 
PSI4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PSI5 
1 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 0 
1.00% 1.90% 0.78% 1.11% 1.33% 0.95% 0.53% 0.67% 0.00% 
PSI8  
2 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 
2.00% 1.90% 2.34% 2.22% 0.89% 0.95% 1.05% 1.33% 1.54% 
PSI9 
4 3 4 9 4 5 3 3 2 
4.00% 2.86% 3.13% 5.00% 1.78% 2.38% 1.58% 2.00% 1.54% 
PSI10 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PSI11 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PSI12 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 
1.00% 0.95% 0.78% 0.56% 0.44% 0.95% 1.05% 0.00% 0.00% 
Num 9 10 12 24 13 12 10 7 5 
% 9.00% 9.52% 9.38% 13.33% 5.78% 5.71% 5.26% 4.67% 3.85% 




5.4.3 Analysis of PSI induced by communication errors in reference group 
TPSR system is an annual report from Taiwan joint commission on hospital accreditation 
(TJCHA). In 2006 there were 171 hospitals and clinics reporting their patient safety events to 
TJCHA, till 2014 the reporting hospitals and clinics increased to 662 and the event number 
increased from 8,899 to 61,943 cases, as shown in Table 31. The PSI events presented here in 
Table 31 were collected from hospitals with and without SBAR implementation as well as 
hospitals utilising different communication tools in their handoff system. Therefore, it is 
difficult identify a culprit for the change in PSI. Again, the top three PSIs induced by 
communication errors in the reference group is the endo-tube incidents (PSI 9), injurious 
behavior (PSI 8), and drug related incidents (PSI 1). Both the percentage and total incident 
number of endo-tube incidents are increasing. As mentioned earlier, endo-tube incidents was 
most commonly found to induce actual harm in patient safety, further leading to comorbidities 
when compared to other PSIs. It is therefore a critical issue to reduce this type of errors. 
Generally speaking, approximately 10% of the incidents were caused by communication errors 
in the TPSR system, and that is why we aim to investigate the effectiveness on PSI prevention 
by application of SBAR protocol in the handoff system. Unfortunately, it is important to keep 
in mind that even though SBAR protocol was implemented in Taiwan for five years (since year 
2010), many hospitals and clinics did not participate in this program. So from the data shown 
in the TPSR annual report, we are not surprise to see no significant improvement in the 




Table 31 to analyze PSI by communication errors in reference group  
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Hospital 171 199 248 293 552 631 698 655 662 
Events 8,899 14,941 25,280 32,918 50,205 54,740 59,798 63,882 61,943 
Mean(E/H) 48 77 96 119 85 87 88 90 91 
PSI1 
232 287 362 535 759 1125 1593 1789 919 
2.61% 1.92% 1.43% 1.63% 1.51% 2.06% 2.66% 2.80% 1.48% 
PSI3 
45 86 147 105 158 300 412 487 373 
0.51% 0.58% 0.58% 0.32% 0.31% 0.55% 0.69% 0.76% 0.60% 
PSI4 
10 12 33 29 76 97 59 112 101 
0.11% 0.08% 0.13% 0.09% 0.15% 0.18% 0.10% 0.18% 0.16% 
PSI5 
60 254 408 489 324 509 412 850 1039 
0.67% 1.70% 1.61% 1.49% 0.65% 0.93% 0.69% 1.33% 1.68% 
PSI8 
317 373 621 803 1110 1239 1534 1700 1502 
3.56% 2.50% 2.46% 2.44% 2.21% 2.26% 2.57% 2.66% 2.42% 
PSI9 
352 612 820 1247 1529 2280 2645 2935 2697 
3.96% 4.10% 3.24% 3.79% 3.05% 4.17% 4.42% 4.59% 4.35% 
PSI10 
5 8 29 24 38 42 19 66 30 
0.06% 0.05% 0.11% 0.07% 0.08% 0.08% 0.03% 0.10% 0.05% 
PSI11 
2 2 10 12 9 26 28 45 6 
0.02% 0.01% 0.04% 0.04% 0.02% 0.05% 0.05% 0.07% 0.01% 
PSI12 
87 89 249 307 249 302 300 342 569 
0.98% 0.60% 0.98% 0.93% 0.50% 0.55% 0.50% 0.54% 0.92% 
Number 1110 1723 2679 3551 4252 5920 7002 8326 7236 
% 12.47% 11.53% 10.60% 10.79% 8.47% 10.81% 11.71% 13.03% 11.68% 





5.5 Comparing the change of PSI induced by communication errors within 
control, experimental and reference group 
Figure 5 is the comparison of percentage of change in PSI induced by communication 
error between the control group, experimental group and reference group. From this figure, we 
can see that the year 2010 is a diverging point, where the experimental group was found to 
show the maximum percentage change. We believe this is due to the implementation of SBAR 
protocol in the handoff system in the experimental group, even though PSI is a lag indicator in 
this setting since they were collected and calculated in the following year after the introduction 
of SBAR protocol. However, no significant difference was noted between the control and 
reference group (blue line and green line). The control group made no change in their handoff 
system, so the reflected data is not surprising. The data in the reference group (TPSR) is 
collected from a mixture of hospitals with and without the implementation of SBAR protocol 
as well as implementation of other communication tools. No significant change was noted in 
the reference group.  With continuous SBAR implementation, the number of PSIs induced by 
communication errors showed a gradual reduction, and by the end of year 2014, only 3.85% of 
the PSIs is induced by communication errors. Patient safety is in a key indicator to hospital 
accreditation nowadays. This result suggests that utilizing a well established and standardized 
communication tool in the medical team or in patient groups plays an important role in 










5.6 To study the effect of patient safety events on patient health  
In this study we also analyzed the severity of harm in patient care quality caused by patient 
safety events. Level of harm was classified into four categories being injury, non-injury, near 
miss and no account. Injury level also further be breakdown into five subtype being death, 
extreme, severe, moderate and mild. The injury levels are defined as below. 
 Death: Resulting in the death of patient. 
 Extremely severe: Causing permanent disability or dysfunction of a patient, such as 
physical disability and brain damage. 
 Severe: Events resulting in patient injuries, which require additional visit, evaluation, 
and observation as well as operation, hospitalization, or extending stays in the hospital 
(e.g bone fracture or pneumothorax). 
 Moderate: Events resulting in patient injuries, which require additional visit, evaluation, 
observation, or processing (e.g measuring blood pressure, pulse, and blood sugar more 
than ordinal, X-ray, blood tests, urine analysis, wound dressing, stitching, hemostatic 
therapy, 1~2 dose of medication.) 
 Mild: Events causing injuries, but do not need or require slight treatment, without 
additional care, such as red skin, scratch, and bruise. 
This classification was defined according to the level of harm and patient outcome standard 
from TPSR report system. An „incident‟ is any event or circumstance that led to unintended or 
unexpected harm, loss or damage. A „Near Miss‟ is an event or occurrence which, due to 
skillful management or a fortunate turn of events that would have led to harm, loss or damage. 
A follow up analysis was performed in an incidental event as suggested by TJCHA, thus root 
cause analysis (RCA) system was adapted by the hospital administration team. RCA provided a 
platform in reviewing the incident and through this analysis, tone will be able to distinguish 
whether the harm is preventable or not  
5.6.1 To study the effect of patient safety events on patient health in control group 
The effect of patient safety events on patient health in control group is presented in Table 
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32. From the result, one can see that the percentage of actual injury induced by PSE was 
approximately 40% per year with the most common level of injury falling between moderate 
and mild injury. No significant change was noted in harmful patient caring quality from 2006 
to 2014. Within all level of harm, approximately 1% results in death of the patient. Severe level 
of harm was approximately 3% per year, and improvement can be made to secure patient safety. 
In the event of death or serious injury, reporting must be made immediately. A skillful way to 




Table 32 Influence on patient health by patient safety event in control group 
Ctrl. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
1 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 3 
0.91% 0.93% 0.75% 1.06% 0.43% 1.04% 0.67% 0.97% 0.98% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.35% 0.00% 0.32% 0.00% 
Severe 
3 3 5 4 5 9 9 11 9 
2.73% 2.78% 3.73% 2.13% 2.14% 3.13% 3.02% 3.55% 2.95% 
Moderate 
22 19 22 39 48 39 42 57 52 
20.00% 17.59% 16.42% 20.74% 20.51% 13.54% 14.09% 18.39% 17.05% 
Mild 
17 15 25 34 42 43 60 40 50 
15.45% 13.89% 18.66% 18.09% 17.95% 14.93% 20.13% 12.90% 16.39% 
subtotal 40 47 48 54 86 115 107 123 117 
% 36.36% 43.52% 35.82% 28.72% 36.75% 39.93% 35.91% 39.68% 38.36% 
No injury 
24 19 29 47 43 70 70 65 61 
21.82% 17.59% 21.64% 25.00% 18.38% 24.31% 23.49% 20.97% 20.00% 
Near miss 
3 4 4 8 9 8 8 10 13 
2.73% 3.70% 2.99% 4.26% 3.85% 2.78% 2.68% 3.23% 4.26% 
NA 
40 47 48 54 86 115 107 123 117 
36.36% 43.52% 35.82% 28.72% 36.75% 39.93% 35.91% 39.68% 38.36% 
Total 110 108 134 188 234 288 298 310 305 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 




5.6.2 To study the effect of patient safety events on patient health in experimental group 
The effect of patient safety events on patient health in experimental group is shown in 
Table 33. Comparing to the control group, the percentage of moderate and mild injury level  
is approximately 40% of the total events. No injury level falls between 30 to 40%. Near miss 
level varies from 17 to 27%. Although a ―near miss‖ didn’t cause actual harm to the patient, the 
potential to induce injury exists, thus they need to be managed carefully. The total events in the 
experimental group showed an increasing trend from 100 cases in 2006 to 130 cases in 2014 
(1.3 times increase from 2006). From 2010 onward, where the SBAR protocol was introduced 
into the handoff system of the experimental group, the numbers of critical injures such as 
severe, extreme, and death was fewer than that of the control hospital. Indeed, these fatal 
incidents need to be avoided by taking actions such as communication tool, education system, 




Table 33 The influence on patient health by patient safety event in experimental group 
Exp. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
1.00% 0.95% 0.78% 0.56% 0.89% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
3 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 
3.00% 2.86% 2.34% 1.67% 0.89% 0.48% 1.05% 0.67% 0.77% 
Moderate 
21 31 37 36 48 33 27 30 26 
21.00% 29.52% 28.91% 20.00% 21.33% 15.71% 14.21% 20.00% 20.00% 
Mild 
15 20 20 27 34 34 34 30 26 
15.00% 19.05% 15.63% 15.00% 15.11% 16.19% 17.89% 20.00% 20.00% 
Subtotal 40 55 61 67 86 68 63 61 53 
% 40.00% 52.38% 47.66% 37.23% 38.22% 32.38% 33.15% 40.67% 40.77% 
No injury 
35 28 38 73 83 79 87 56 51 
35.00% 26.67% 29.69% 40.56% 36.89% 37.62% 45.79% 37.33% 39.23% 
Near miss 
21 18 26 35 49 55 36 29 23 
21.00% 17.14% 20.31% 19.44% 21.78% 26.19% 18.95% 19.33% 17.69% 
NA 
4 4 3 5 7 8 4 4 3 
4.00% 3.81% 2.34% 2.78% 3.11% 3.81% 2.11% 2.67% 2.31% 
Total 100 105 128 180 225 210 190 150 130 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 




5.6.3 To study the effect of patient safety events on patient health in reference group 
Table 34 is the effect of patient safety events on patient health in the control group 
extracted from TPSR annual report in Taiwan. The increase in reported incidence was caused 
by the disclosure policy in hospitals providing a more transparent and safety environment.The 
total events increased from 8176 events in 2006 to 60559events in 2014, 7.4 times more than 
that of 2006. Till the end of year 2014, there were 12243, 7387, 832, 61 and 371 cases causing 
an injury level of mild, moderate, severe, extreme and death, respectively. The injury rate 
decreased from 49.21% in 2006 to 34.5% in 2014. The percentage of ―near miss‖ increased 
throughout the study period (2006-2014). Even though the errors or incident occurred did not 
induce actual harm to the patients, this has reflected numerous problems in the medical system 
such as unfavorable working conditions (long working hours and short of human resource) for 
medical staffs. To effectively avoid repetition of these errors that can potentially injures patient, 
improvements must be made on identifying and devising a plan for the underlying causes 
associated with near misses. Systemic problems can be identified via the reports filed to TPSR. 
Errors that occur but do not result in patient harm, and errors that could have caused harm but 
were mitigated in some manner before they ever reached the patient were termed near misses. 
Reported number of near misses are as frequent as adverse events, they can provide invaluable 
information for proactively reducing errors. Analysis of reported errors have revealed many 
―hidden risks‖ (near misses, dangerous situations, and deviations or variations) which pointed 
out various insufficiency of the system  as well as unintentional acts of clinician performance 
that may eventually cause patients harm. 
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Table 34 The influence on patient health by patient safety event in reference group 
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
88 110 224 233 303 338 365 329 371 
1.08% 0.72% 0.94% 0.67% 0.65% 0.61% 0.60% 0.56% 0.61% 
Extreme 
21 36 52 92 92 113 126 87 61 
0.26% 0.23% 0.22% 0.26% 0.20% 0.20% 0.21% 0.15% 0.10% 
Severe 
302 503 622 768 873 986 961 861 832 
3.69% 3.27% 2.61% 2.20% 1.87% 1.79% 1.57% 1.46% 1.37% 
Moderate 
2478 3518 4163 4637 5291 6745 7049 7330 7387 
30.31% 22.88% 17.50% 13.25% 11.33% 12.22% 11.52% 12.40% 12.20% 
Mild 
1134 2329 3261 6531 8971 10503 11287 12066 12243 
13.87% 15.15% 13.71% 18.67% 19.21% 19.03% 18.45% 20.42% 20.22% 
Subtotal     4,023   6,496   8,322  12,261  15,530  18,685  19,788  20,673  20,894  
% 49.21% 42.25% 34.98% 35.05% 33.26% 33.85% 32.35% 34.99% 34.50% 
No injury 
3539 5482 8472 12700 16983 20354 22716 20618 22068 
43.29% 35.66% 35.61% 36.30% 36.37% 36.89% 37.13% 34.89% 36.44% 
Near miss 
311 2692 6022 8004 12086 13667 16039 15938 16273 
3.80% 17.51% 25.32% 22.88% 25.88% 24.77% 26.22% 26.97% 26.87% 
NA 
303 705 972 2022 2102 2476 2631 1867 1324 
3.71% 4.59% 4.09% 5.78% 4.50% 4.49% 4.30% 3.16% 2.19% 
Total 8176 15375 23788 34987 46701 55182 61174 59096 60559 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 




5.7 To analyze the degree of injury by each PSI 
In this section we investigate the degree of injury in each of the patient safety indicator. 
Each of the different patient safety indicators showed a different level of injury in patient 
caring quality, we further discuss them in the following sections. 
5.7.1 The effect of drug-related incidents (PSI1) on patient health 
Level of injury induced by drug-related incidents was described in figure 6 and Table 
35-37. Fig. 6 is the graph showing drug-related incident change throughout the study. The 
experimental group showed a declining trend from 30.19% in 2006, lowest reaching 4.9% in 
2011 followed by a slight increase to 12% in 2014. The trend showed a significant 
improvement in the incident caused by the department of pharmacy. The introduction of SBAR 
protocol in the handoff system was an important intervention in this department. The rate of 
injury was lower than that of the control group after SBAR implementation. The control group 
also showed a declining trend from 38.6% in 2006 to 20.43% in 2014, however, this change is 
not as significant in the experimental group. Both the control and experimental groups showed 
a declining trend since 2006, reflecting the importance of patient safety in the department of 
pharmacy. In contrast, the change in the reference group (TPSR system) did not show much 
change, suggesting that many hospitals within the nation have not yet taken an efficient action 
to avoid the incidents caused by the department of pharmacy. Table 35 is the result collected 
and analyzed from the control group. The number of injury events increased over time, even 
though the percentage of the incident decrease. Table 36 is the result of experimental group 
with SBAR protocol introduced in the handoff system of the medical team; Both the total 
number of events and the percentage of incident in this group showed a significant reduction 
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when compared to the baseline. The result of reference control group (TPSR system) is shown 
in Table 37. Both the total number of events and the percentage of the incident did not show a 
significant reduction when compared to the baseline, suggesting no effective intervention was 












Figure 6 Analysis of injure level by drug-related incidents (PSI 1) 
 
 
Table 35 Injury level by drug-related incidents (PSI 1) in control group 
Ctrl. group  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 2.38% 0.00% 1.47% 1.19% 1.05% 1.02% 1.08% 
Moderate  
3 3 4 5 5 8 7 8 8 
11.54% 8.82% 9.52% 10.00% 7.35% 9.52% 7.37% 8.16% 8.60% 
Mild 
7 6 7 11 12 10 17 8 10 
26.92% 17.65% 16.67% 22.00% 17.65% 11.90% 17.89% 8.16% 10.75% 
subtotal 10 9 12 16 18 19 25 17 19 
% 38.46% 26.47% 28.57% 32.00% 26.47% 22.61% 26.31% 17.34% 20.43% 
No injury 
10 15 8 3 18 35 26 30 32 
38.46% 44.12% 19.05% 6.00% 26.47% 41.67% 27.37% 30.61% 34.41% 
Near miss 
5 10 20 26 28 30 42 48 38 
19.23% 29.41% 47.62% 52.00% 41.18% 35.71% 44.21% 48.98% 40.86% 
NA 
1 0 2 5 4 0 2 3 4 
3.85% 0.00% 4.76% 10.00% 5.88% 0.00% 2.11% 3.06% 4.30% 
Total  26 34 42 50 68 84 95 98 93 




Table 36 Injury level by drug-related incidents (PSI 1) in experimental group 
Exp. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death  
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 1.52% 1.02% 0.87% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1.89% 2.17% 1.52% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
Moderate 
6 6 6 5 5 3 3 3 3 
11.32% 13.04% 9.09% 5.10% 4.35% 2.94% 3.26% 5.26% 6.00% 
Mild  
9 12 14 13 11 2 3 4 3 
16.98% 26.09% 21.21% 13.27% 9.57% 1.96% 3.26% 7.02% 6.00% 
subtotal 16 19 22 19 17 5 7 7 6 
% 30.19% 41.30% 33.34% 19.39% 14.79% 4.90% 7.61% 12.28% 12.00% 
No injury 
22 16 24 53 60 57 60 30 29 
41.51% 34.78% 36.36% 54.08% 52.17% 55.88% 65.22% 52.63% 58.00% 
Near miss 
12 10 20 25 35 40 25 20 15 
22.64% 21.74% 30.30% 25.51% 30.43% 39.22% 27.17% 35.09% 30.00% 
NA 
3 1 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 
5.66% 2.17% 0.00% 1.02% 2.61% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total 53 46 66 98 115 102 92 57 50 
Ps. ―%‖ calculated by ―individual level/total PSI1‖, e.g. %: 0/53=0.0 % in death level on year 2006 
 
Table 37 Injury level by drug-related incidents (PSI 1) in reference group 
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 
Extreme 
1 1 3 6 17 6 7 13 0 
0.11% 0.07% 0.08% 0.13% 0.21% 0.07% 0.06% 0.10% 0.00% 
Severe 
3 9 12 27 42 29 20 42 13 
0.32% 0.67% 0.33% 0.56% 0.51% 0.32% 0.16% 0.34% 0.10% 
Moderate  
53 102 124 247 383 400 427 454 533 
5.66% 7.62% 3.41% 5.15% 4.69% 4.35% 3.38% 3.63% 4.04% 
Mild 
67 152 266 494 846 936 1045 1132 1037 
7.15% 11.35% 7.31% 10.31% 10.37% 10.17% 8.27% 9.06% 7.86% 
subtotal 124 264 405 774 1289 1372 1501 1643 1586 
% 13.24% 19.71% 11.13% 16.15% 15.79% 14.92% 11.89% 13.15% 12.02% 
No injury 
700 818 2108 2485 4081 3835 5398 4786 5123 
74.71% 61.09% 57.90% 51.85% 50.02% 41.68% 42.71% 38.31% 38.82% 
Near miss 84 197 1006 1234 2446 3548 4680 5608 6048 
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8.96% 14.71% 27.63% 25.75% 29.98% 38.56% 37.03% 44.89% 45.83% 
NA 
29 60 122 300 342 446 1060 456 439 
3.09% 4.48% 3.35% 6.26% 4.19% 4.85% 8.39% 3.65% 3.33% 
Total 937 1339 3641 4793 8158 9201 12639 12493 13196 
Ps. ―%‖ calculated by ―individual level/total PSI1‖, e.g. %: 0/937=0.0 % in death level on year 2006 
 
5.7.2 The effect of falling incidents (PSI 2) on patient health 
The result of falling incidents (PSI 2) is shown in Figure 7 and Table 38-40. Fig.7 is the 
graph showing change in falling incidents throughout the study period. The experimental group 
(Table 39) shows a clear decline of incident from 94.7% in 2010 to 21.4% in 2014; a 
significant reduction in this incident was shown by the intervention of SBAR in the handoff 
system. Till the end of 2014, percentage of no injury incidence is 71.43%, however, no 
significant change is noted via statistic analysis. The control group (Table 38) had a fluctuating 
trend ranging from 15.9% to 39.4%, however this change was not as significant as that of the 
experimental group. Albeit when compared to the control group, the control group has a lower 
incident in inducing actual injury to the patient, the total event of injury in the experimental 
group is lower than the control group. In contrast, in the reference group (TPSR system) the 
incident rate of actual harm did not show much change, with the percentage ranging from 
47.4% to 54.9% throughout the study period (Table 40). The number of events resulting in 
death and extreme injury is few, but a large portion of the incident ends up in moderate and 
mild injury. Even though more than 50% of the events end up in the no injury category, at the 
end of the study, the total number of injury events caused by falling incidents from TPSR 












Figure 7 Analysis of injure level by falling incidents (PSI 2) 
 
Table 38 Injury level by falling incidents (PSI 2) in control group 
Ctrl. group  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 
5.00% 5.00% 2.63% 2.08% 3.45% 2.27% 1.41% 3.45% 1.67% 
Moderate  
3 3 2 5 9 6 11 3 6 
15.00% 15.00% 5.26% 10.42% 15.52% 13.64% 15.49% 5.17% 10.00% 
Mild 
1 1 10 6 10 0 16 6 10 
5.00% 5.00% 26.32% 12.50% 17.24% 0.00% 22.54% 10.34% 16.67% 
Subtotal 5 5 13 12 21 7 28 11 17 
% 25.00% 25.00% 34.21% 25.00% 36.21% 15.91% 39.44% 18.96% 28.34% 
No injury 
15 14 24 35 36 36 42 46 41 
75.00% 70.00% 63.16% 72.92% 62.07% 81.82% 59.15% 79.31% 68.33% 
Near miss 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
NA 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
0.00% 5.00% 2.63% 2.08% 1.72% 2.27% 1.41% 1.72% 3.33% 
Total  20 20 38 48 58 44 71 58 60 
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Ps. ―%‖ calculated by ―individual level/total PSI2‖, e.g. %: 0/20=0.0 % in death level on year 2006 
 
Table 39 Injury level by falling incidents (PSI 2) in experimental group  
Exp. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death  
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
1 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 1 
14.29% 10.00% 12.50% 15.38% 10.53% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 7.14% 
Moderate 
6 7 6 8 8 2 3 3 2 
85.71% 70.00% 75.00% 61.54% 42.11% 50.00% 60.00% 60.00% 14.29% 
Mild  
0 0 0 1 7 1 1 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.69% 36.84% 25.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Subtotal 7 9 7 11 18 3 4 4 3 
% 100.0% 90.0% 87.5% 84.6% 94.7% 75.0% 80.0% 80.0% 21.4% 
No injury 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 10 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.69% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 71.43% 
Near miss 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
NA 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.00% 10.00% 12.50% 7.69% 5.26% 25.00% 20.00% 20.00% 7.14% 
Total 7 10 8 13 19 4 5 5 14 





Table 40 Injury level by falling incidents (PSI 2) in reference group  
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
1 2 3 3 3 8 4 4 10 
0.07% 0.09% 0.10% 0.06% 0.04% 0.09% 0.04% 0.04% 0.08% 
Extreme 
2 3 5 9 13 14 16 17 12 
0.14% 0.13% 0.17% 0.18% 0.19% 0.16% 0.17% 0.15% 0.10% 
Severe 
74 90 132 149 388 392 303 280 299 
5.29% 3.96% 4.51% 2.91% 5.76% 4.54% 3.22% 2.52% 2.42% 
Moderate  
176 376 277 351 509 645 847 2047 2125 
12.59% 16.53% 9.46% 6.86% 7.56% 7.47% 9.00% 18.45% 17.23% 
Mild 
110 388 588 1846 2546 2878 3182 3457 3655 
7.87% 17.06% 20.08% 36.06% 37.81% 33.33% 33.81% 31.16% 29.64% 
Subtotal 363 859 1005 2358 3459 3937 4352 5805 6101 
% 25.97% 37.77% 34.31% 46.06% 51.37% 45.59% 46.24% 52.33% 49.48% 
No injury 
1004 1311 1756 2483 2938 4240 4877 5156 6147 
71.82% 57.65% 59.95% 48.51% 43.63% 49.10% 51.82% 46.48% 49.85% 
Near miss 
7 11 27 39 62 79 11 28 8 
0.50% 0.48% 0.92% 0.76% 0.92% 0.91% 0.12% 0.25% 0.06% 
NA 
24 93 141 239 275 379 172 104 74 
1.72% 4.09% 4.81% 4.67% 4.08% 4.39% 1.83% 0.94% 0.60% 
Total 1398 2274 2929 5119 6734 8635 9412 11093 12330 




5.7.3 The effect of medical procedure incidents (PSI 5) on patient health 
The result of medical procedure incidents is shown in Table 41-43. The control group did 
not have any injury event before 2010, and after that the number of injuries was few (Table 41). 
Regarding the experimental group (Table 42), the number of injury event is similar to that of 
thecontrol group, no significant change is noted after SBAR intervention. In contrast, the 
reference group (TPSR system) also remains relatively steady, with the incident percentage 
ranging from 54.91% to 61.29% (Table 43). Total event number increased from 364 in 2006 to 
1136 in 2016 =. The percentage of no injury was approximately 30% throughout and the 
percentage of near miss ranged from 4% to 7 %. The totally number of events in medical 
procedure incidents from TPSR report showed a 2.92 times increase in 2014 when compared to 
the baseline. 
Table 41 Injury level by medical incidents (PSI 5) in control group 
Ctrl. group  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 
Moderate  
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 50.00% 25.00% 20.00% 
Mild 
0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 40.00% 50.00% 25.00% 20.00% 
Subtotal 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 3 
% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 60.00% 100.0% 50.00% 60.00% 
No injury 
0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 40.00% 0.00% 25.00% 20.00% 
Near miss 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 20.00% 
NA 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Total  0 0 0 0 0 5 2 4 5 
Ps. ―%‖ calculated by ―individual level/total PSI5‖, e.g. %: 0/5=0.0 % in death level on year 2014 
 
Table 42 Injury level by medical incidents (PSI 5) in experimental group 
Exp. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Moderate 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Mild  
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.0% 50.0% 20.00% 20.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Subtotal 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 40.00% 40.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
No injury 
0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 60.00% 40.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Near miss 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
NA 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 2 2 






Table 43 Injury level by medical incidents (PSI 5) in reference group 
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
6 14 18 10 17 11 20 20 14 
0.71% 0.90% 0.86% 0.89% 1.09% 0.71% 1.01% 0.98% 0.73% 
Extreme 
5 10 12 5 5 10 7 11 11 
0.59% 0.64% 0.57% 0.45% 0.32% 0.65% 0.36% 0.54% 0.57% 
Severe 
71 140 155 134 153 145 160 102 168 
8.40% 9.01% 7.39% 11.95% 9.81% 9.42% 8.12% 6.23% 8.74% 
Moderate  
207 396 465 280 384 390 459 476 472 
24.50% 25.48% 22.16% 24.98% 24.63% 25.32% 23.29% 23.36% 24.56% 
Mild 
75 254 312 258 377 310 486 517 471 
20.71% 22.72% 26.64% 23.02% 24.18% 20.13% 24.66% 25.37% 24.51% 
Subtotal 364 814 962 687 936 866 1132 1126 1136 
% 54.91% 58.75% 57.62% 61.29% 60.03% 56.23% 57.44% 56.48% 59.11% 
No injury 
262 420 615 300 389 432 588 571 596 
31.01% 27.03% 29.31% 26.76% 24.95% 28.05% 29.83% 28.02% 31.01% 
Near miss 
24 87 156 87 108 106 81 138 104 
5.21% 5.60% 7.44% 7.76% 6.93% 6.88% 4.11% 6.77% 5.41% 
NA 
32 137 118 47 126 136 170 108 86 
8.88% 8.82% 5.62% 4.19% 8.08% 8.83% 8.63% 8.73% 4.47% 
Total 682 1458 1851 1121 1559 1540 1971 1943 1922 




5.7.4 The effect of law accidents (PSI 7) on patient health 
The result of law incident is shown in Table 44-46. Both the control group (Table 44) and 
the experimental group (Table 45) showed no significant change through the study period 
(even though an slight increase in the number of events was noted in the control group, 
especially in 2014). In contrast, in the reference group (TPSR system) the incidence of law 
accident increased throughout the study period, ranging from 26.84% to 79.57% (Table 46). 
Total event number increased from 117 in 2006 to 1628 in 2014. By the end of the study, the 
rate of no injury declined to 0.54%, suggesting insufficient action taken to reduce actual harm 
The total number of injury by law accidents from TPSR report at the end of the study showed a 
5.64 times increase from baseline. 
Table 44 Injury level by law accidents (PSI 7) in control group 
Ctrl. group  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Moderate  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Mild 
0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 6 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 33.33% 50.00% 50.00% 
Subtotal 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 6 
% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 33.33% 50.00% 50.00% 
No injury 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 33.33% 25.00% 25.00% 
Near miss 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 
NA 
0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 33.33% 25.00% 8.33% 
Total  0 0 0 0 0 8 3 4 12 




Table 45 Injury level by law accidents (PSI 7) in experimental group 
Exp. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Moderate 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Mild  
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 12.50% 0.00% 33.33% 
Subtotal 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 12.50% 0.00% 33.33% 
No injury 
0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 37.50% 50.00% 0.00% 
Near miss 
0 0 0 0 0 4 3 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 40.00% 37.50% 25.00% 33.33% 
NA 
0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 40.00% 12.50% 25.00% 33.33% 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 10 8 4 3 





Table 46 Injury level by law accidents (PSI 7) in control group 
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
2 0 3 2 9 3 9 3 0 
0.46% 0.00% 0.30% 0.14% 0.48% 0.11% 0.39% 0.15% 0.00% 
Extreme 
2 3 6 3 0 11 1 9 7 
0.46% 0.43% 0.61% 0.22% 0.00% 0.41% 0.04% 0.44% 0.34% 
Severe 
13 28 28 27 27 39 67 53 53 
2.98% 3.99% 2.84% 1.95% 1.45% 1.45% 2.88% 2.60% 2.59% 
Moderate  
16 30 56 69 60 92 71 64 82 
3.67% 4.27% 5.68% 4.98% 3.22% 3.41% 3.05% 3.14% 4.01% 
Mild 
84 198 301 589 111 385 1073 622 1486 
19.27% 28.21% 30.53% 42.53% 5.96% 14.29% 46.05% 30.52% 72.63% 
Subtotal 117 259 394 690 207 530 1221 751 1628 
% 26.84% 36.90% 39.96% 49.82% 11.11% 19.67% 52.41% 36.85% 79.57% 
No injury 
182 300 331 485 1182 811 758 543 11 
41.74% 42.74% 33.57% 35.02% 63.51% 30.09% 32.53% 26.64% 0.54% 
Near miss 
26 78 76 56 36 889 163 567 407 
17.43% 11.11% 7.71% 4.04% 1.93% 32.99% 7.00% 27.82% 19.89% 
NA 
43 65 106 154 436 465 188 130 30 
13.99% 9.26% 18.76% 11.12% 23.43% 17.25% 8.07% 8.68% 0.00% 
Total 368 702 907 1385 1861 2695 2330 1991 2076 





5.7.5 The effect of injurious behavior (PSI 8) on patient health 
The result of injurious behavior (PSI 8) is shown in Table 47-49. The control group (Table 
47) had no death, extreme or severe injury until 2010. After since, it had only one severe case 
in year 2011 and 2012. Most of the injury levels fall in the mild injury or no injury group, 
ranging from 30 to 40% and 33 to 45% respectively. In the experimental group (Table 48), the 
number of injury event is similar to that of the control group. The injury level of death, extreme 
and severe was zero since 2006 and remain that way until the end of study (2014). The number 
of events leading to moderate injury showed a significant reduction after 2010, suggesting 
possible effect from the intervention of SBAR. There were a few events leading to mild injury, 
however, no significant difference is noted. Most of the injury level fall into the no injury 
group, approximately 60% of them result in no actual harm. In contrast, the reference group 
(TPSR system) had approximately 50% of the events leading to actual harm (Table 49), with 
the total number of injurious behavior event increasing from 455 in 2006 to 1964 in 2014. 
Nearly thirty percent of the events result in mild injury. Approximately 40% of the events 
result in no injury and 5% result in near miss. At the end of the study, the total number of 
events caused by injurious behaviors from TPSR report showed a growth of 4.05 times from 
the baseline. 
Table 47 Injury level by injurious behavior (PSI 8) in control group 
Ctrl. group  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 




1 1 2 2 4 3 6 5 3 
10.00% 10.00% 20.00% 13.33% 18.18% 15.00% 20.00% 17.24% 14.29% 
Mild 
3 3 3 5 7 8 9 9 7 
30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 33.33% 31.82% 40.00% 30.00% 31.03% 33.33% 
Subtotal 4 4 5 7 11 12 16 14 10 
% 40.00% 40.00% 50.00% 46.66% 50.00% 60.00% 53.33% 48.27% 47.62% 
No injury 
4 4 4 5 10 6 12 13 9 
40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 33.33% 45.45% 30.00% 40.00% 44.83% 42.86% 
Near miss 
2 2 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 
20.00% 20.00% 10.00% 20.00% 0.00% 5.00% 3.33% 3.45% 4.76% 
NA 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.55% 5.00% 3.33% 3.45% 4.76% 
Total  10 10 10 15 22 20 30 29 21 
Ps. ―%‖ calculated by ―individual level/total PSI8‖, e.g. %: 3/10=30.0 % in mild level on year 2006 
 
Table 48 Injury level by injurious behavior (PSI 8) in experimental group 
Exp. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Moderate 
2 1 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 
33.33% 16.67% 25.00% 16.67% 25.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Mild  
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 8.33% 0.00% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 
Subtotal 2 1 3 3 3 1 0 0 1 
% 33.33% 16.67% 37.50% 25.00% 25.00% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 
No injury 
4 3 5 7 7 4 6 5 4 
66.67% 50.00% 62.50% 58.33% 58.33% 66.67% 85.71% 62.50% 66.67% 
Near miss 
0 2 0 1 1 1 1 3 1 
0.00% 33.33% 0.00% 8.33% 8.33% 16.67% 14.29% 37.50% 16.67% 
NA 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.33% 8.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total 6 6 8 12 12 6 7 8 6 





Table 49 Injury level by injurious behavior (PSI 8) in reference group 
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
14 21 11 9 29 15 81 61 10 
1.50% 1.46% 0.66% 0.38% 0.90% 0.40% 1.94% 1.52% 0.26% 
Extreme 
1 3 4 6 7 14 12 14 3 
0.11% 0.21% 0.24% 0.26% 0.22% 0.37% 0.29% 0.35% 0.08% 
Severe 
23 34 20 31 78 97 58 76 63 
2.46% 2.37% 1.20% 1.32% 2.42% 2.59% 1.39% 1.89% 1.67% 
Moderate  
121 186 243 456 631 704 774 753 591 
12.96% 12.97% 14.57% 19.47% 19.60% 18.82% 18.51% 18.77% 15.63% 
Mild 
296 463 546 855 992 1209 1412 1262 1297 
31.69% 32.29% 32.73% 36.51% 30.82% 32.32% 33.76% 31.46% 34.29% 
Subtotal 455  707  824  1,357  1,737  2,039  2,337  2,166  1,964  
% 48.72% 49.30% 49.40% 57.94% 53.96% 54.50% 55.89% 53.99% 51.93% 
No injury 
415 645 750 855 1371 1457 1575 1642 1590 
44.43% 44.98% 44.96% 36.51% 42.59% 38.95% 37.66% 40.93% 42.04% 
Near miss 
28 47 33 72 36 109 186 65 94 
3.00% 3.28% 1.98% 3.07% 1.12% 2.91% 4.45% 1.62% 2.49% 
NA 
36 35 61 58 75 136 84 139 134 
3.85% 2.44% 3.66% 2.48% 2.33% 3.64% 2.01% 3.46% 3.54% 
Total 934 1434 1668 2342 3219 3741 4182 4012 3782 




5.7.6 The effect of endo-tube incidents (PSI 9) on patient health 
The result of endo-tube incidents (PSI 9) is shown in Table 50-52. The control group 
(Table 50)  had no events resulting in death, extreme and severe injuries since 2006, but after 
y2010, there is one severe case in each year from 2011 to 2014. The total number of events 
also showed an increasing trend throughout the study and had more than doubled of the events 
by 2014. Percentage of no injury events is approximately 30% to 40%. In the experimental 
group (Table 51), the number of injury event is similar to the control group, with no events 
resulting in death, extreme and severe injury from the beginning to the end of the study. The 
total number of endo-tube incidents had a reduction after 2010, this was also reflected in the 
total events leading to moderate and mild injury. Additionally, the percentage of events 
resulting in no injury showed an increasing trend, suggesting possible effect of SBAR 
intervention. In contrast, the reference group (TPSR system) showed an increase in the total 
number of incidents with no significant difference in the percentage (approximately 60%) 
resulting in actual damage (Table 52), which is similar to the control group, suggesting no 
effective preventive measure was carried out. The percentage of events resulting in no injury 
was approximately thirty percent and the percentage of events resulting in near miss was about 
1% to 2%. At the end of the study, the total number of injury events caused by endo-tube 
incidents from TPSR report showed a growth of 9.71 times from the baseline.. 
Table 50 Injury level by endo-tube incidents (PSI 9) in control group 
Ctrl. group  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.17% 2.27% 2.56% 2.44% 
Moderate  
5 5 4 9 9 15 15 13 13 
31.25% 33.33% 33.33% 36.00% 32.14% 32.61% 34.09% 33.33% 31.71% 
Mild 
5 5 3 8 7 13 12 10 11 
31.25% 33.33% 25.00% 32.00% 25.00% 28.26% 27.27% 25.64% 26.83% 
Subtotal 10 10 7 17 16 29 28 24 25 
% 62.50% 66.66% 58.33% 68.00% 57.14% 63.04% 63.63% 61.53% 60.98% 
No injury 
6 5 5 7 11 14 14 14 15 
37.50% 33.33% 41.67% 28.00% 39.29% 30.43% 31.82% 35.90% 36.59% 
Near miss 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.57% 2.17% 2.27% 0.00% 2.44% 
NA 
0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 0.00% 4.35% 2.27% 2.56% 0.00% 
Total  16 15 12 25 28 46 44 39 41 
Ps. ―%‖ calculated by ―individual level/total PSI9‖, e.g. %: 5/16=31.25% in mild level on year 2006 
 
 
Table 51 Injury level by endo-tube incidents (PSI 9) in experimental group 
Exp. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Moderate 
6 5 6 8 7 2 3 2 2 
33.33% 26.32% 33.33% 29.63% 23.33% 13.33% 21.43% 20.00% 25.00% 
Mild  
5 8 5 9 9 1 1 0 1 
27.78% 42.11% 27.78% 33.33% 30.00% 6.67% 7.14% 0.00% 12.50% 
Subtotal 11 13 11 17 16 3 4 2 3 
% 61.11% 68.43% 61.11% 62.96% 53.33% 20.00% 28.57% 20.00% 37.50% 
No injury 
6 5 6 9 12 11 9 7 5 
33.33% 26.32% 33.33% 33.33% 40.00% 73.33% 64.29% 70.00% 62.50% 
Near miss 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
NA 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 
5.56% 5.26% 5.56% 3.70% 6.67% 6.67% 7.14% 10.00% 0.00% 
Total 18 19 18 27 30 15 14 10 8 




Table 52 Injury level by endo-tube incidents (PSI 9) in reference group 
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
1 5 5 13 17 11 15 21 6 
0.11% 0.20% 0.13% 0.23% 0.21% 0.12% 0.16% 0.21% 0.06% 
Extreme 
1 2 2 4 6 9 8 8 8 
0.11% 0.08% 0.05% 0.07% 0.07% 0.10% 0.09% 0.08% 0.08% 
Severe 
17 42 35 46 58 65 80 61 57 
1.79% 1.66% 0.93% 1.95% 1.45% 1.37% 1.94% 1.61% 0.59% 
Moderate  
321 609 1008 1575 2051 2397 3281 3108 3287 
33.72% 24.12% 26.76% 28.42% 25.01% 25.78% 35.43% 31.08% 34.20% 
Mild 
289 590 887 1598 2122 2957 2267 2345 2997 
30.36% 23.37% 23.55% 28.84% 25.88% 31.80% 24.48% 23.45% 31.19% 
Subtotal 629 1248 1937 3236 4254 5439 5651 5543 6355 
% 66.09% 49.43% 51.42% 59.51% 52.62% 59.17% 62.10% 56.43% 66.12% 
No injury 
331 1180 1513 1882 3326 3345 3168 3543 3182 
34.77% 46.73% 40.16% 33.96% 40.56% 35.98% 34.21% 35.43% 33.11% 
Near miss 
15 36 56 32 113 41 170 115 3 
1.58% 1.43% 1.49% 0.58% 1.38% 0.44% 1.84% 1.15% 0.03% 
NA 
15 61 261 329 446 411 171 699 70 
1.58% 2.42% 6.93% 5.94% 5.44% 4.42% 1.85% 6.99% 0.73% 
Total 990 2525 3767 5479 8139 9236 9160 9900 9610 




5.7.7 The effect of laboratory incidents (PSI12) on patient health 
The result of laboratory incidents is shown in Table 53-55. The control group (Table 53) 
had no events resulting in death, extreme and severe injuries since 2006. Events resulting in 
moderate injury occurred after 2010, with only one case per year from 2011 to 2014. The 
number of mild injury was few, with 1 to 3 events per year. Most of the events in laboratory 
incidents end up in the no injury and near miss category. Disregarding the few events, a rise in 
total event number was noted throughout the study. In the experimental group (Table 54), the 
number of injury event is similar to the control group, with no events resulting in death, 
extreme and severe injury from the beginning to the end of the study. Some events did end up 
with moderate and mild injury in the experimental group, at most being one event per year. 
Similar to the control group, most of the laboratory incidents end up in the no injury and near 
miss category. In contrast, the reference group (TPSR system) showed an increase in the total 
number of events but have a decreasing trend in the percentage of events resulting in actual 
harm (Table 55). Even though most of the laboratory incidents end up in the no injury and near 
miss category, a significant percentage of the incidents end up causing moderate and mild 
injury.The percentage of events resulting in no injury ranges from 22% to 48%, whereas the 
percentage of events resulting in near miss ranges from 11% to 50%. At the end of the study, 
the total number of injury events caused by laboratory incidents from TPSR report showed a 
growth of 20.38 times from the baseline. 
Table 53 Injury level by laboratory incidents (PSI 12) in control group 
Ctrl. group  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury Death 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Moderate  
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.00% 5.56% 4.76% 4.76% 
Mild 
1 0 0 1 1 3 1 3 1 
14.29% 0.00% 0.00% 14.29% 8.33% 15.00% 5.56% 14.29% 4.76% 
Subtotal 1 0 0 1 1 4 2 4 2 
% 14.29% 0.00% 0.00% 14.29% 8.33% 20.00% 11.12% 19.05% 9.52% 
No injury 
2 2 4 3 4 8 6 6 7 
28.57% 28.57% 44.44% 42.86% 33.33% 40.00% 33.33% 28.57% 33.33% 
Near miss 
4 5 4 2 6 6 9 10 10 
57.14% 71.43% 44.44% 28.57% 50.00% 30.00% 50.00% 47.62% 47.62% 
NA 
0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 
0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 14.29% 8.33% 10.00% 5.56% 4.76% 9.52% 
Total  7 7 9 7 12 20 18 21 21 
Ps. ―%‖ calculated by ―individual level/total PSI12‖, e.g. %: 1/7=14.29 % in mild level on year 2006 
 
 
Table 54 Injury level by laboratory incidents (PSI 12) in experimental group 
Exp. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Moderate 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.09% 0.00% 
Mild  
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 9.09% 11.11% 11.11% 12.50% 9.09% 12.50% 
Subtotal 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 1 
% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 18.18% 11.11% 11.11% 12.50% 18.18% 12.50% 
No injury 
2 3 2 3 3 3 2 4 2 
25.00% 42.86% 33.33% 27.27% 33.33% 33.33% 25.00% 36.36% 25.00% 
Near miss 
5 4 4 6 5 4 5 4 5 
62.50% 57.14% 66.67% 54.55% 55.56% 44.44% 62.50% 36.36% 62.50% 
NA 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 9.09% 0.00% 
Total 8 7 6 11 9 9 8 11 8 




Table 55 Injury level by laboratory incidents (PSI 12) in reference group 
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 1 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.06% 0.02% 
Extreme 
0 0 2 4 3 1 7 6 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.21% 0.18% 0.09% 0.02% 0.16% 0.13% 0.00% 
Severe 
1 5 4 15 17 28 17 34 8 
0.46% 0.67% 0.42% 0.69% 0.50% 0.70% 0.40% 0.72% 0.18% 
Moderate  
21 25 24 24 169 278 280 188 45 
9.59% 3.35% 2.50% 1.10% 5.01% 6.92% 6.51% 3.99% 1.01% 
Mild 
45 99 99 88 112 226 261 407 744 
20.55% 13.25% 10.31% 4.04% 3.32% 5.63% 6.07% 8.64% 16.67% 
Subtotal 67 129 129 132 303 535 567 638 798 
% 30.59% 17.27% 13.44% 6.06% 8.99% 13.32% 13.18% 13.54% 17.88% 
No injury 
107 198 327 745 1165 1276 1300 1318 1020 
48.86% 26.51% 34.06% 34.22% 34.57% 31.77% 30.23% 27.97% 22.85% 
Near miss 
25 385 480 1250 1616 2002 2156 2658 2518 
11.42% 51.54% 50.00% 57.42% 47.95% 49.85% 50.13% 56.40% 56.41% 
NA 
20 35 24 50 286 203 278 99 128 
9.13% 4.69% 2.50% 2.30% 8.49% 5.05% 6.46% 2.10% 2.87% 
Total 219 747 960 2177 3370 4016 4301 4713 4464 




5.7.8 The effect of other incidents (PSI 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13) on patient health 
As the individual number of incident for PSI 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, and 13 was too few to perform 
an analysis independently, we decided to. combine these indicators into one indicator. We 
named this as other incidents, which includes surgery-related incidents (PSI 3), blood 
transfusion incidents (PSI 4), public accidents (PSI 6), unexpected cardiopulmonary arrests 
(PSI 10), anesthesia incidents (PSI 11) and other incidents (PSI 13). The result is shown in 
Table 56-58. The control group (Table 56) showed several incidents resulting in death with a 
maximum of 3 events in 2011, 2013, and 2014. Several incidents also end up causing extreme 
injury with one event in 2011 and 2013. Most of the incidents resulting in actual injury fall into 
the moderate injury category. No injury and near miss category have a fluctuating trend with 
no obvious pattern noted. Similar finding was noted in the experimental group (Table 57). 
However, the number of events resulting in death, extreme and severe injury was zero with the 
exception of one event resulting in severe injury at 2009. The number of events resulting in 
moderate and mild injury varies throughout the study with the total number of events similar to 
that of control group. As mentioned earlier, the no injury and near miss category have a 
fluctuating trend with no obvious pattern noted. In contrast, the reference group (TPSR system) 
had an acute drop in the number of events resulting in actual injury. A decrease from 
approximately 3000 events annually to approximately 1300 events. (Table 58).Different from 
the control and experimental group, most of the incidents ends up in the no injury and near 
miss category instead of moderate and mild injury. A logical explanation is not available due to 
pooling of the data. At the end of the study, the total number of injury events caused all these 
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other incidents from TPSR report showed a growth of 4.97 times from the baseline. 
Table 56 Injury level by other incidents (PSI 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13) in control group 
Ctrl. group  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
1 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 3 
3.23% 4.55% 4.35% 4.65% 2.17% 4.92% 5.71% 5.26% 5.77% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.64% 0.00% 1.75% 0.00% 
Severe 
2 2 3 3 2 5 5 7 5 
6.45% 9.09% 13.04% 6.98% 4.35% 8.20% 14.29% 12.28% 9.62% 
Moderate  
10 7 10 18 21 5 1 26 20 
32.26% 31.82% 43.48% 41.86% 45.65% 8.20% 2.86% 45.61% 38.46% 
Mild 
0 0 2 3 5 3 3 1 4 
0.00% 0.00% 8.70% 6.98% 10.87% 4.92% 8.57% 1.75% 7.69% 
Subtotal  13 10 16 26 29 17 11 38 32 
% 41.94% 45.46% 69.57% 60.47% 63.04% 27.88% 31.43% 66.65% 61.54% 
No injury 
3 7 3 1 7 13 6 12 9 
9.68% 31.82% 13.04% 2.33% 15.22% 21.31% 17.14% 21.05% 17.31% 
Near miss 
13 2 4 16 8 31 17 5 8 
41.94% 9.09% 17.39% 37.21% 17.39% 50.82% 48.57% 8.77% 15.38% 
NA 
2 3 0 0 2 0 1 2 3 
6.45% 13.64% 0.00% 0.00% 4.35% 0.00% 2.86% 3.51% 5.77% 
Total  31 22 23 43 46 61 35 57 52 
Ps. ―%‖ calculated by ―individual level/total PSI(3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13)‖, e.g. %: 1/31=3.23 % in death level on year 2006 
 
 
Table 57 Injury level by other incidents (PSI 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13) in experimental group 
Exp. group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Extreme 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Severe 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.88% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Moderate 
1 11 16 11 24 26 18 21 19 
16.67% 73.33% 80.00% 64.71% 63.16% 44.07% 35.29% 39.62% 48.72% 
Mild  
0 0 0 1 5 26 26 24 18 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.88% 13.16% 44.07% 50.98% 45.28% 46.15% 
Subtotal  1 11 16 13 29 52 44 45 37 
% 16.67% 73.33% 80.00% 76.47% 76.32% 88.14% 86.27% 84.90% 94.87% 
No injury 1 1 1 0 1 0 5 7 0 
114 
 
16.67% 6.67% 5.00% 0.00% 2.63% 0.00% 9.80% 13.21% 0.00% 
Near miss 
4 2 2 3 8 6 2 1 1 
66.67% 13.33% 10.00% 17.65% 21.05% 10.17% 3.92% 1.89% 2.56% 
NA 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
0.00% 6.67% 5.00% 5.88% 0.00% 1.69% 0.00% 0.00% 2.56% 
Total 6 15 20 17 38 59 51 53 39 
Ps. ―%‖ calculated by ―individual level/total PSI(3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13)‖, e.g. %: 1/6=16.67 % in moderate level on year 2006 
 
 
Table 58 Injury level by other incidents (PSI 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13) in reference group 
TPSR group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Injury 
Death 
64 68 184 195 225 287 232 215 327 
2.42% 1.39% 2.28% 1.55% 1.65% 1.78% 1.35% 1.66% 2.48% 
Extreme 
9 14 18 55 41 48 68 9 20 
0.34% 0.29% 0.22% 0.44% 0.30% 0.30% 0.40% 0.07% 0.15% 
Severe 
100 155 236 339 110 191 256 213 171 
3.78% 3.17% 2.93% 2.70% 0.81% 1.19% 1.49% 1.64% 1.30% 
Moderate  
1563 1794 1966 1635 1104 1839 910 240 252 
59.03% 36.64% 24.38% 13.01% 8.08% 11.41% 5.30% 1.85% 1.91% 
Mild 
168 185 262 803 1865 1602 1561 2324 556 
6.34% 3.78% 3.25% 6.39% 13.65% 9.94% 9.09% 17.94% 4.22% 
Subtotal  1,904  2,216  2,666  3,027  3,345  3,967  3,027  3,001  1,326  
% 71.91% 45.27% 33.06% 24.09% 24.49% 24.62% 17.63% 23.16% 10.06% 
No injury 
538 610 1072 3465 2531 4958 5052 3059 4399 
20.32% 12.46% 13.29% 27.56% 18.53% 30.76% 29.41% 23.62% 33.38% 
Near miss 
102 1851 4188 5234 7669 6893 8592 6759 7091 
3.85% 37.81% 51.93% 41.64% 56.14% 42.77% 50.01% 52.19% 53.81% 
NA 
104 219 139 845 116 300 508 132 363 
3.93% 4.47% 1.72% 6.72% 0.85% 1.86% 2.96% 1.02% 2.75% 
Total 2648 4896 8065 12571 13661 16118 17179 12951 13179 






6.1 Discussion of study findings 
In this section we discuss the findings from our analysis results. 
6.1.1 Why did the total patient safety events keep growing in the TPSR annual report 
Till the end of this study, the total number of of patient safety events reported to the TPSR 
system showed an increasing trend. This can be explained by two major changes in the 
reporting system. First, the total number of hospital joining / reporting to the TPSR system has 
been increasing from the beginning to the end of the study. Currently in Taiwan, there are 972 
hospitals, 1,251 nursing care unit and 200 psychiatric hospitals (total of 1451 units). In 2006, a 
total of 171 units (including hospital, nursing unit and psychiatric hospital) were reporting to 
the TPSR, and by 2014, the reporting hospitals were 376 hospitals in TPSR system, with a 
reporting rate of 38.7% in all hospitals, and the reporting rate for non hospital caring units 
(included nursing care units and psychiatric hospitals) were 286, only 19.7% of the units 
reported to TPSR. Both hospital and non-hospital caring units should be encouraged to report 
to TPSR. The other reason for the increase in reported events was due to promotion of 
information disclosure of patient safety incidents in hospital accreditation. According to the 
accreditation regulation of Taiwan Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation (TJCHA), the 
outcome of patient safety was committed to be a key indicator to health care quality in hospital. 
Since 2003, TJCHA have been continuously encouraging all the hospital in Taiwan to report to 
TPSR. The reporting of patient safety events became the duty of medical team and hospital 
administration staff. This policy set by TJCHA aims to prevent injury, encourage patient safety 
in hospital, and to promote health caring quality. Therefore, based on the above mentioned 
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condition, it is not surprise to find and increase filing of reports in patient safety events by 
hospitals. We suggest that useful strategies for preventing PSI includes information disclosure, 
report incentive, definitive handoff system, through education and patient involvement. 
 
6.1.2 The reason SBAR handoff system was used to promote patient safety 
 In healthcare environment, a significant percentage of errors can be attributed to 
communication breakdowns and lack of effective teamwork. Communication failures have 
been identified by the Joint commission of American as the primary root cause in more than 
70% of serious events from 1995 to 2003. Communication breakdowns and teamwork failures 
have been identified as the key contributing factors in the occurrence of patient safety incidents. 
Therefore, an effective method to reduce the incidents during caring process via 
communication skills became a critical issue for hospital management and accreditation. While 
healthcare workers are typically assigned to work in teams to provide and manage patient care, 
they are generally not well-trained in the generic or non-technical skills (such as 
communication, situational awareness, decision making and teamwork). Lack of generic or 
non-technical skills may lead to patient safety incidents and medical errors. This was supported 
by the findings and verified by the statistical analysis (student t-test and GEE) we presented in 
section 5.2. In the experimental group that adapted SBAR protocol in its handoff system, the 
total number of events in patient safety incident showed a significant decline when compare to 
the hospital without SBAR implementation. From the outcome of patient health analysis and 
the analysis in the level of injuries, one can see that the experimental group generally showed a 
117 
 
better performance when compared to the control and reference group. The findings via SBAR 
application in the experimental group were concluded below: 
 Change of patient safety culture: the culture of patient safety in the experimental 
hospital was changed through SBAR tool. 1) A shared belief that healthcare is a 
high-risk occupation, 2) A commitment to detect and analyze patient injuries and 
near misses, and 3) Provide an environment to encourage filing reports of patient 
safety events and to take disciplinary actions if needed. 
 Change of communication within team member: the SBAR tool was used in 
conjunction with the collaborative communication model. Empowering nurses, 
physicians, and staff to be proactive in communication and collaboration, aiming to 
carry out a better practice and finally, improve patient safety. 
 Changing the quality of clinical management: while being involved in SBAR 
intervention, the medical team showed an improvement in efficiency and quality of 
information exchange during handoff. It also provided a powerful communication 
setting and collaboration strategies to the health care providers; further facilitate 
improvements in working environment, communication at the nurse-to-nurse and 
physician-to-nurse levels, teamwork/collaboration, satisfaction, and patient safety 
and outcomes. 
 SBAR is a structured communication technique to standardize communication between 
two or more people. Due to the potential advantages, SBAR became an effective tool in the 




6.1.3 The effectiveness of SBAR intervention on patient safety 
According to our result shown in Table 17, the handoff system in the experimental group 
used SBAR protocol during handoff. We compared the difference between experimental and 
control groups in different phase (Aim 1 to Aim 4). We found no significant difference within 
both groups before and during the implementation of SBAR (Aim 1 and 2), suggesting no 
significant change in patient safety events was present during that period. We hypothesize that 
the absence of significant change in 2010 (initializing year) between control and experimental 
group was due to the deferred effect of patient safety by SBAR implementation. Patient safety 
is the outcome of caring process, so if we want to investigate the effect of SBAR protocol 
intervention, the effect will be reflected in the next or coming years. This hypothesis was 
supported by the statistical analysis. After three and five years of SBAR implementation (year 
2012 and 2014), a significant difference in patient safety events was noted between the control 
and experimental group (Aim 3 and 4). The hospital in the control and experimental group has 
a similar scale on its medical service, medical staff, clinical department and administration 
system. The only difference was the adaptation of SBAR protocol in the handoff system in the 
experimental group from 2010. If we look into the change of PSI from the baseline of the 
experimental group (Aim 5 to 7), a statistical significant difference was noted between 2009 
and 2014. This result verified the effectiveness of SBAR disregarding the number of patient 
safety events increasing yearly. As mentioned earlier, many medical staffs including clinicians, 
nurses, pharmacists, technicians and administrators was encouraged to report to the TPSR in 
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the circumstance of an incident. Similarly, there was also an increase in the total events within 
the control group (Aim 5A to 7A), from the baseline, moreover, showed a statistical significant 
difference when analyzed by pair t-test. These results confirm the effectiveness of SBAR 
protocol on communication within team member to provide a better caring quality on patient 
health. SBAR was showed to bridge the differences in interdisciplinary communication and 
ensure that critical information is delivered consistently. In facilitating stronger communication, 
SBAR promotes a focus on teamwork rather than individual expertise to overcome avoidable 
medical errors. 
 
6.1.4 The reason for drug, falling and endo-tube incidents being the top threes 
In this study we found the top three incidents were drug-related incidents, falling incidents 
and endo-tube incidents in control, experimental, and reference group, the results are shown in 
Table 24-26. We here provide a hypothesis for this phenomenon. While analyzing the control 
and experimental group, drug-related incidents were most often iatrogenic; mainly due to drug 
delivery and drug dispensation errors. Therefore, training and educate to pharmacists via tools 
like SBAR are important and valuable for reducing this kind of errors. The second common 
incident was the falling incidents in hospitals; the occurrence ratio in 2014 was 19.67% (Table 
24), 10.77% (Table 25) and 20.36% (Table 26) in control group, experimental group and 
reference group, respectively. Generally these incidents were caused by unsteady gait and use 
of sedative medication. Improvement of personnel training and implementation of standard 
audit procedures for drug delivery and dispensation are the keys to prevent this type of incident. 
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When compared to the control and reference group, the rate of falling incident in experimental 
group (with SBAR implementation) was lower than other groups, however, even with 
implementation of SBAR protocol  human negligence errors cannot be avoided. The death 
rate as a result of falling incident was 0.08 % from TPSR annual report (Table 40), the injury 
rate as a result of falling incidents was approximately 49.5% (49.48%). The data suggests that 
more can be done to avoid falling incidents, and both the patient and medical team should be 
actively involved. Lastly, the endo-tube incidents, an incident frequently lead to a fatal 
outcome in patient safety. From the result showed in Table 51, the injury rate in 2014 was 
66.12 %, including a death rate of 0.06%, extreme injury level of 0.08%, severe injury level of 
0.59%, moderate injury level of 34.2% and mild injury level of 31.19%, the harm induced on 
patient safety is evident. Table 50 showed the result of experimental group, the harm caused by 
endo-tube incidents was lower than that of the control group in both the number of events and 
percentage of events resulting in actual injury since 2010. The standardized handoff system 
within medical team was the key for reducing this incident from human errors. A good handoff 
system allows each and every medical member to review their work and responsibility during 
the caring process, limiting human errors and promote patient health. In the endo-tube 
incidents, the major culprit was iatrogenic negligence and failure to carry out standard 
operating procedures; therefore, enhancing patient safety culture via education system was an 




6.1.5 How to improve the caring quality by SBAR protocol 
The outcome of patient health was analyzed with the results shown in Table 32-34. The 
outcome of caring quality in the experimental group (Table 33) showed that 40.77% of the 
total event result in actual injury at the end of the study.  When compared to the control 
(38.36%) and the reference group (34.50%), the experimental group showed a higher 
percentage of inducing actual harm form events. However, despite the higher percentage than 
the control and reference group, the level of harm in the experimental group mainly falls in the 
category of moderate (20%) and mild (20%) injury with no death and extreme events. The data 
suggests that the caring quality in avoiding serious injury is better than that of the control and 
reference group. In control group (Table 32) and reference group (Table 34) there were 3 and 
371 events of death in 2014. This harm could be prevented by a good management system such 
as quality assurance system, accreditation system, education system, and handoff system. In 
this study we adapted the SBAR protocol as an intervention study in the experimental group. 
The effect on patient safety event and injury prevention was significant, and we can conclude 
the following: 
 The SBAR tool was designed primarily for physician-nurse communications in high 
urgency situations; both clinical and non-clinical staffs were educated to use and apply 
SBAR tool, making the quality management process universally relevant within an 
interdisciplinary caring team. 
 The adapted SBAR tool was effectively used in a variety of patient care situations, most 
notably in the discussions regarding changes in the patient care plan, the situation 
included both urgent (e.g. changes in patient status) and non-urgent situations (e.g. 
team debriefing following a challenging admission), discharge planning, as a debriefing 
tool, and for conflict resolution. 
 The effectiveness of SBAR use appeared promising, particularly within the 
experimental team’s perceptions in team communication and patient safety culture. The 
culture of team work on patient care and patient safety prevention was changed by 
application of SBAR. 
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 With targeted use of the SBAR, evaluation of its effectiveness may be more specific 
and show more change across other domains (e.g. teamwork across teams and handoffs 
and transitions). 
 
6.1.6 Timing of the incident during SBAR implementation 
By analyzing the incidents by timing in the experimental hospital, we found that 
drug-related incidents usually occurred between 8 and 10 am. Falls and endo-tube incidents 
usually occurred between 4 and 6 am. The most common location of these incidents was in the 
wards, followed by intensive care unit and pharmacies. If we analyzed the reporting of 
incidents by occupation, nurses filed the highest number of incidents, followed by pharmacists 
and administrative staffs. The chance of physician filing the report for  incidents was low. A 
plan to disclose the information on patient safety for gaining a more safety environment is a 
critical issue in hospital administration. The hospitals need to be assisted in establishing an 
internal report and incentive system in the case of patient safety incidents. Hospitals also need 
to provide a protection mechanism to allow staff members to report incidents without 
experiencing the fear of punishment. By identifying the root causes of these incidents and 
sharing the lessons learned across the hospitals is one of the effective way such incidents can 
be avoided. 
 
6.2 Comparison with previous studies 
The analysis of patient safety events was showed in section 5.1, the finding was similar to 
the research published by Lin et al, 2012. By analyzing the 13 types of incident between 
control and experimental group, we found that the most common types of incidents were 
drug-related incidents, falling incidents, and endo-tube incidents; this result is consistent with 
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Lin et al, 2012. Regarding the effectiveness of adapting SBAR protocol in handoff system, our 
data showed a significant difference before and after application of SBAR between control and 
experimental group (Table 17). The result was most evident after three and five years 
application of SBAR. This finding was consistent with the study performed by Compton et al, 
2012. Furthermore, we suggest an existence of re-enforcing effect when SBAR implementation 
was long enough to induce a change in the culture of patient safety and the barrier of 
communication within medical teams. This study also analyzed the events of patient safety 
(Table 24).  We identified the top three events from experimental group being the 
drug-realted incident, falling incidents and endo-tube incidents. The number of incidents in 
these indicators declined after implementation of SBAR. This finding was partially consistent 
with the finding of McDonald et al, 2002. In addition, we studied the effect of PSI on patient 
injury; the finding was shown in Table 33. With the intervention of SBAR used in handoff 
system, the outcome of patient caring quality was significantly better than the control group, 
with most of incidents resulting in a moderate (20%) and mild (20%) injury, with a few 
resulting in severe injury of patient health. The result further support the effectiveness of 
SBAR protocol implementation in patient safety. This finding is partially consistent with the 
result of Dunsford et al, 2016 and Randmaa et al, 2014. The result of individual PSI on the 
outcome of patient healthwas shown in section 5.6. The finding in experimental group fails to 
identify a significant difference in the degree of harm before and after implementation of 
SBAR in individual PSI. Albeit a conclusion cannot be reached, the association between PSI 
and the outcome of patient caring quality was correlative, and this finding was consistent with 
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the study performed by Rivard et al, 2008. 
 
6.3 Implication of study results 
The aims of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of SBAR protocol in handoff 
system, the patient safety indicators were used as the outcome marker to investigate caring 
quality and to confirm the effectiveness of SBAR intervention.  The results presented are due 
to the contribution of physicians, nurses, pharmacists, technicians, administrators, patient and 
patient family. Therefore, proper team collaboration, training and education is the key to 
achieve the final goal of enhancingpatient safety. From this study, we have shown the 
effectiveness of SBAR protocol in handoff system; however, many challenges exists in 
teamwork training (e.g from culture of working environment, leadership, organization 
commitment, hospital accreditation, and the awareness of working staff). We therefore suggest 
the following to be included during future implication of SBAR protocol. 
 Teamwork training could include scenarios that challenge clinicians to determine how 
and what to report. Multisite team training programs should be included.  
 Additional research is required to investigate the effect of team training in error 
frequency, reporting and disclosure skills, especially among team member; The method 
to file the report is associated to different outcomes when disclosing the information to 
patients and families (e.g Web-based reporting systems shortens the time used for 
reporting via data entry, time from incident to report, time to systems improvement, as 
well as allowing a classification of systems for improvement strategies and the effect of 
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strategies on error outcomes).  
 Although the number of incidents reported has increased significantly by the year, the 
proportion of incidents that are reported is still too low. The main reason for this is due 
to the consequence that medical staff may reveive severe punishment under Taiwan’s 
laws if their carelessness is found to have caused such incidents. Thus, hospital 
personnel may under report patient safety incidents due to the fear of being punished. 
So to encourage the filing of report by medical staff without being punished is a critical 
but yet unsolved issue to avoid under-reporting of patient safety events. 
 Assisting medical team including nurses, physicians, pharmacists, and technicians etc. 
to change their current practice of handoff communication could be difficult. However, 
findings from this study suggests the use of adapted SBAR tool is helpful in both 
individual and team communications, ultimately affecting perceived changes in the 
safety culture of medical team. This change in communication requires time to incubate 
and develop in team work; an immediate effect on the outcome of patient safety is 
unlikely. 
 Allows the management teams to facilitate improvements in working environment, 
enhance communication at the nurse-to-nurse and physician-to-nurse levels, promoting 





6.4 The limitation of PSI on evaluating the patient safety by TPSR system 
In this study, we used the indicators of patient safety from TPSR system; these indicators 
revealed the adverse events induced by patient safety incidents. RCA were then used to clarify 
the injury level caused by the patient safety event. Data for these indicators was extracted from 
the TPSR dataset rather than from the hospital directly. This limited the analysis on clinical 
outcome such as mortality, morbidity and infection rate, we cannot perform further 
investigation by the available data. However the consistence of PSI’s data is an advantage for 
comparing the quality of patient care within hospitals. Additionally, the injury degree caused 
by patient safety events was been determined by vaeious RCA team, a bias cannot be excluded 
as we fail to retrieve the original files from the RCA team due to confidentiality issue. The 
above mentioned concluded most of the limitations in this study as the PSI indicators used was 
from a secondary database. 
 
6.5 Future research direction 
Many of the finding in this study fails to achieve a definite conclusion and there are many 
potential studies to be completed. We provide probable directions and suggestion for applying 
of SBAR in the study of patient safety as following   
 Satisfaction survey during the period of SBAR implementation: Gaps do exist in 
this study, we don’t know the satisfaction of medical staffs including nurse, physicians, 
pharmacists, technicians, administrators, supporting staffs, patients, and patient 
families etc., during the period of SBAR implementation. To observe the effect of 
SBAR requires a long time to observe the change in the outcome; so a longitudinal 
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study on the change in satisfaction within team member is necessary. Here we suggest 
the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), it is an easy approach to use for studying 
the perception from frontline workers during the phase of SBAR implementation. The 
SAQ can be summarized into six dimensions that are perceptions of management (unit 
or hospital), safety climate, teamwork climate, working conditions, stress cognition 
and job satisfaction. By using this tool, we can correlate the attitude of team member 
with the occurrence of patient safety event, and to analyze the causes and their 
solutions for promoting care quality. 
 Improving patient safety culture in health care system: A change in the culture to 
blame one individual need to be changed, as errors / unfortunate event should be 
treated as opportunities to improve the system and prevent harm. To study the 
effectiveness of incentive for reporting patient safety events, using incentive system to 
replace the blame and punishment, the change of patient safety culture needs to be 
encouraged on basis of policy and strategy. Future work can investigate on the 
determination of an effective incentive design that can assist in the increase of 
reporting PSI across different departments, allow further prevention and reduction of 
the potential patient safety incidents. 
 SBAR assessment on quality of care: Future research will have to address the 
following, including the need for refresher education within team members after 
initial SBAR education; the need for formal physician to be educated about SBAR use, 
and the possibility of conducting annual competency validation of the utilization of 
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SBAR. Research should also examine the effect of SBAR on quality of care and 
patient outcomes in controlled trials. 
 To evaluate the performance by SBAR intervention in a large hospital: a large 
hospital like a medical center or teaching hospital will face different challenge in the 
management system in clinical care and quality assurance. In our study, the 
intervention was performed in a metropolitan hospital, application of the SBAR tool 
in a medical center will provide invaluable data. The effectiveness of SBAR may be 




7. Conclusion  
In this study, we have verified the intervention of SBAR protocol implemented in the 
handoff system by medical team member. Even though the total PSE showed an increasing 
trend over the study peroid, the intervention still lead to a significant reduction in PSE when 
compared to the control group. Several years after the implementation of SBAR protocol in the 
experimental group, the effectiveness of SBAR on PSE became more evident, showing a 
significant difference from that of control group where SBAR was not applied. In general, the 
disclosure of PSE in Taiwan’s hospital became more transparent due to the accreditation of 
TJCHA; therefore the increase of reported incidents yearly from the hospital is a normal 
phenomenon. We used student t-test and GEE to verify the effectiveness of SBAR on PSE and 
patient injury effects. Both the student t-test and GEE showed that with the intervention of 
SBAR in handoff system, there is a significant decrease on PSE in the experimental group, and 
the harm level was also less when compared to the control group. Furthermore, in the analysis 
of the individual PSI, the drug-related incidents, falling incidents and endo-tube incidents 
showed a declining trend after SBAR implementation. 
Commonly, the implement of SBAR in the experimental group will led to a significant 
improvement in patient safety. In the study, we analyzed the individual PSI caused by 
communication errors only and the result did not showed much significance. However, the 
SBAR did reduce the PSE in volume and on the level of injury in the experimental group. We 
also found that the number of incidents resulting in actual critical injures such as severe, 
extreme, and death in the experimental group was obviously fewer and less than the control 
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hospital. Based on our finding, this intervention obviously improved patient safety and health. 
During the process of SBAR implementation, we found four additional primary impacts 
that SBAR brought other than enhanced communication; it facilitated collaborative 
development within team groups across departments, accurate information exchange, saving 
the manpower in teamwork and caring cost. 
Finally, according to our finding in effectiveness analysis, the culture of patient 
safetyrequires time to development and adapt. Changing communication processes was a 
re-learning process and this is the reason for SBAR intervention only to show a significant 
effect in the experimental group three and five years after its implementation. This also 
provides an explanation for the absence of significant difference during SBAR implementation. 
SBAR requires the awareness of staffs, a change of working habit etc. and all of these requires 
an adaption time to formulate a streamline culture between individual vs individual, system vs 
system, and individual vs system. Empowering nurses, physicians, and staff to be proactive in 
communication and collaboration, aiming to carry out a better practice and finally, improve 
patient safety is critical. A good team collaboration, use of standardized communication tool 
and providing a continuous education and training course to the management and clinical care 
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